University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Librarian Scholarship at Penn Law
Spring 2016

Human Survival, Risk, and Law: Considering Risk Filters to
Replace Cost-Benefit Analysis
John William Draper

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/librarian_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Environmental Policy
Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons,
Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, Natural
Resources Law Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Political Economy
Commons, Risk Analysis Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons

HUMAN SURVIVAL, RISK, AND LAW:
CONSIDERING RISK FILTERS TO REPLACE COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS
John William Draper
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 302
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 302
I. Assessing and Confronting Risk .................................................................................................. 304
II. Key Factors in this Approach ..................................................................................................... 310
A. Liberty versus Security: The Increasing Tradeoff............................................................... 312
B. Rationality and Reasonableness .......................................................................................... 315
C. Social Change ..................................................................................................................... 319
III. The Safe Level of Risk Imposition ............................................................................................ 323
A. Irreversibility ...................................................................................................................... 326
B. Safety-Based Regulation ..................................................................................................... 334
C. Commensurability and Comparability ................................................................................ 339
IV. Feasible Risk Reduction ............................................................................................................ 342
A. Feasibility Standards ........................................................................................................... 345
B. Significance of Risk ............................................................................................................ 347
1. Rethinking Social Norms........................................................................................ 349
C. Feasibility Analysis in Practice ........................................................................................... 352
1. General Structure and Formulation of Feasibility Analysis.................................... 354
2. Modification of Feasibility Regulations ................................................................. 357
3. (Mis-)Applications of Feasibility Analysis............................................................. 359
a. Industry Definition ......................................................................................... 364
b. Technological Feasibility ............................................................................... 366
c. Economic Feasibility...................................................................................... 367
D. Weighing Hardships (Comparative Significance)............................................................... 367
1. Comparability ......................................................................................................... 369
2. Fairness ................................................................................................................... 373
E. Defending Feasibility Analysis ........................................................................................... 375
1. Path-Dependency and Time-Inconsistency............................................................. 377
2. Social Welfare Analysis and the Welfarist Virtues of Feasibility
Analysis .................................................................................................................. 379


Reference Librarian, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. This is to thank Gideon Parchomovsky, David Skeel, Howard Lesnick,
Matt Adler, Greg Keating, Paul George, Tamara Gaskell, and the late Harry
Reicher and Clyde Summers variously for their inspiration, review of earlier drafts,
suggestions, and encouragement. The author takes responsibility for all errors.

301

302

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVII

a.

Does Feasibility Analysis Overcome Difficulties with
Monetization? ................................................................................................ 381
b. Are Thin Increases in Consumer Cost the Same as Worker
Hardships? ..................................................................................................... 382
c. Is the Guidance from Feasibility Analysis Sufficiently Clear?....................... 384
3. Finding a Normative Basis for Feasibility Analysis ............................................... 385
F. Implementing Welfarism with Feasibility Analysis ............................................................ 387
1. Welfarist Problems with Incommensurability ........................................................ 389
G. Summarizing Feasibility Analysis in Risk Regulation ....................................................... 391
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................ 392

ABSTRACT
Selfish utilitarianism, neo-classical economics, the directive of
short-term income maximization, and the decision tool of cost-benefit
analysis fail to protect our species from the significant risks of too
much consumption, pollution, or population. For a longer-term
survival, humanity needs to employ more than cost-justified
precaution.
This article argues that, at the global level, and by extension at all
levels of government, we need to replace neo-classical economics
with filters for safety and feasibility to regulate against significant
risk. For significant risks, especially those that are irreversible, we
need decision tools that will protect humanity at all scales. This
article describes both standards, their operations, and their
interoperability. Further, it defends feasible risk reduction as an
effective decision and regulatory tool.
INTRODUCTION
Although neo-classical economics and its decision tool, costbenefit analysis, are widely understood to be inadequate,1 many have
argued that there is no workable alternative.2 I will show in this
1. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 68 (2004); Frank Ackerman &
Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1557-58 (2002); John William Draper, Why
Law Now Needs to Control Rather than Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016); http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651
[https://perma.cc/ERZ7-CUDB].
2. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 4 (2006).
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article that there is. I will develop an approach that combines safety
analysis with feasibility analysis.
Humanity needs to change the way we process and view
significant risk. As the risk of human extinction or collapse, or
better, the opportunity of human survival, is considered over time,
humanity must continually re-evaluate the risks it faces. We need a
risk filtration system. This article argues that humanity’s risk
filtration system needs to include standards of safety and feasibility
for decisions that involve significant risk to the survival of our
species.
Functionally, safety analysis reduces risk to the point of
insignificance. It may be seen as an affirmative choice such as clean
air or clean water. The safe level of risk imposition may also occur
at the point where risk is rendered insignificant through feasible risk
reduction. I will consider the use of safety-based regulation in the
face of irreversible risk, and I will attempt to provide some sense of
how that regulation can be used to protect billions of lives.
Where the needs of human liberty conflict with the safety standard,
we need another means to reduce risk. Feasibility analysis offers
such a method, and it is compatible with the safety standard.
Feasibility should be both technological and economic, two separate
and distinct operations. I will consider both theoretical and practical
applications of feasibility, and I will defend the use of feasible risk
reduction.
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner have strongly criticized feasibility
analysis,3 but I will show how their criticism is unfounded. In
justifying their description of feasibility analysis, Masur and Posner
claim that in the 1980s and 1990s “the feasibility test had never been
given a clear account.”4 By 2003, there had been a clear account by
Gregory Keating.5 Masur and Posner overlook that account and
attack early versions of those laws as they were implemented. This
article is a defense of Keating’s feasibility analysis, as applied to the
concept of human survival, against the attack on feasibility analysis

3. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657 (2010).
4. Id. at 661.
5. See Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653 (2003).
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by Masur and Posner. All these authors discuss feasibility analysis as
applied to industry.
When one considers the survival of the human species, the merits
of feasible risk reduction become more apparent. Keating’s work
offers and supports a powerful combination of lifesaving and libertysaving mechanisms that fit well with the current human situation,
especially in light of Cass Sunstein’s thought-provoking analysis of
irreversibility.6 We need a decision system that forecloses certain
risky behaviors.
I begin by thinking about how to assess and confront risk that is
both significant and foreseeable. Next, I visit some of the key factors
in fashioning appropriate laws and regulations. Part III discusses
safety-based regulation with special attention paid to irreversibility,
commensurability, and comparability. The fourth pertains to feasible
risk reduction, including discussion of feasibility standards,
significance of risk, and practical implementation. That part also
contains a defense of feasible risk reduction against cost-benefit
analysis with an extension to welfarism. I conclude with some
observations about the implementation of these risk filters.
I. ASSESSING AND CONFRONTING RISK
Humanity should be creative enough to establish robust models,
organizations, regulations, and procedures to cope with and adapt to
the variety, depth, breadth, and sheer number of challenges we, as a
species, may face. Those models, for some purposes might continue
to utilize some form of cost-benefit analysis (CBA).7 In other
situations, CBA may be totally inappropriate. We need to consider
other decision filters.
Humanity should consider whether survival requires regulation of
risk analysis discounting and even financial discounting.8 We may
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227
(2010).
7. Here are some of the many reasons why some would continue to use CBA:
1. The convenience of the unitary metric, 2. The political reality of power politics,
or 3. The decision involves no significant risks.
8. Financial discounting has to do with the payment of interest and savings
incentives. In contrast, if we were to have a negative interest rate, then we would
be penalized for saving. Financial interest rates and financial discounting are to be
differentiated from discounting in risk or in feasibility analysis. The time value of
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need to regulate discounting in order to discourage planning for a
short future. By reducing choice we may be able to minimize
dangerous short-term behavior. It may be safest to calculate and
promulgate certain maximum and minimum standards.
We need to value both the present and the future. Richard Posner
has suggested using negative discount rate to force a longer-term
orientation.9 Such a rate would value the future over the present10
and could provide a severe brake to use on runaway economic
growth. Are there circumstances in which it would be appropriate to
use a negative discount rate that way? Or is the use of such a brake
too problematic due to side effects?11 After all, the present is as
important as the future. We must not lock ourselves into rigid rules
but work for a concerted and cooperative response. In order to better
cooperate, we need to increase the number and variety of
perspectives.12
Humanity needs a clear picture as it assesses and calculates the
risks in its future.13 We must pay attention to science. While we see
money is decidedly different from the time value of life. As Cass Sunstein points
out, human beings cannot be banked; they do not earn interest. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 2004, at 27, 29
(reviewing FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004)).
9. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 152-53
(2004).
10. A negative discount rate would seem to represent a kind of “sacrifice
mode.”
11. The side effects would be significant and morally problematic if we were to
make the death of one person 500 years from now more serious than the death of
one person today.
12. This does not justify a short-term increase in human population. However,
it does justify wider opportunities for participation in decision-making.
13. As sociologist Niklas Luhmann observes,
If there are no guaranteed risk-free decisions, one must abandon the
hope that more research and more knowledge will permit a shift from
risk to security. Practical experience tends to teach us the opposite: the
more we know, the better we know what we do not know, and the more
elaborate our risk awareness becomes. The more rationally we
calculate and the more complex the calculations become, the more
aspects come into view involving uncertainty about the future and thus
risk. Seen from this point of view, it is no accident that the risk
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the problem of risk and survival, how do we analyze it? How do we
analyze the unthinkable? Do we hedge? What is acceptable
morally? When, from a statistical perspective, would it be best to
stop doing what we are doing—or at least slow down—and evaluate
the possible or probable impact of humanity’s cumulative behavior?
After all, we are deep in environmental overshoot14 and at the same
time we are in the process of poisoning ourselves.15 Richard Falk
saw this happening over 40 years ago.16 Humanity finds its choices
becoming increasingly limited.
And, as we shall see,17 the
irreversibility of certain risks requires special treatment. We should
expect and plan for our own risky behavior.
If the risk of global collapse is one-tenth of one percent per year
over the long term, we should nevertheless expend significant
resources on prevention. Some risks may cumulate over time. How
should we consider the risks? Should we merely place a value on
them? The question should be how are we to evaluate the risks or the
rewards. Insurance cannot compensate after the fact for the possible
perspective has developed parallel to the growth in scientific
specialization.
NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 28 (Rhodes Barrett trans., de
Gruyter, 1993).
14. See DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR
UPDATE 137-39 (2004).
15. See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon and Conservation: Rethinking U.S.
Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
593, 613, 616-20 (2010); CARL F. CRANOR, LEGALLY POISONED: HOW THE LAW
PUTS US AT RISK FROM TOXICANTS 132-77 (2011).
16.
We are living in a period of constantly increasing risk and diminishing
opportunity. To illustrate: as the atmosphere grows more contaminated
by a variety of poisons, it becomes ever more difficult to restore
conditions of purity. A situation of irreversibility threatens to arise in
which no amount of feasible effort can counteract the process of
contamination or temperature change.
RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS
HUMAN SURVIVAL 8-9 (1971).
17. See Irreversibility, in The Safe Level of Risk Imposition (III.A) below.

FOR
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losses. Worrying about dollars can get in the way of doing the right
thing. We need to consider what forms of protection are functional
and acceptable.
There are professionals who study risk and are employed to
provide a form of insurance from catastrophe. For example, public
health officials are responsible for disease quarantines and hurricane
evacuations. However, the nature of their employment situation
leaves them with few incentives to actually call an alert. The odds of
disaster could be 10 percent, but the costs of an alarm are high, so
high that false alarms are strongly discouraged. The official’s risk of
job loss is so great that it may seem safer to be quiet and hope. This
kind of thinking occurs even when the catastrophe is a known event
with a frequency, such as hurricanes.18
However, the risks we are considering (too much consumption,
pollution, population, or environmental damage) are generally not
events, like hurricanes, with a record of frequency. Richard Posner
notes that
it requires more mental effort to act on the basis of
probabilities than on the basis of frequencies. Anyone who
doubts this will be disabused by reflection on the inability
even of experts and responsible officials to take the risk of
a 9/11-type terrorist attack seriously until it actually
happened, though the risk was well known.19
It is quite a challenge for humanity to successfully perceive a risk
based on significance and foreseeability, communicate about it, agree
on it, consider a range of responses, plan at least one response,
implement it, and then successfully overcome the risk in order to
survive. Now consider dealing with several of these challenges at
once, and you see better what humanity is up against.
Overall, the systemic risk we face, in our financial world, in
science, in all of life,20 is like the tragedy of the commons.21 No
18. Edward P. Richards, of Louisiana State University, presentation at Penn’s
Wharton School, Nov. 2006.
19. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 10 (2004).
20. See Miguel A. Centeno et al., The Emergence of Global Systemic Risk, 41
ANN. REV. SOC. 65 (2015).
21. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
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individual market participant has an incentive, absent regulation, to
limit risk taking in order to reduce systemic danger to the group.22
There is a tendency for each decision-maker to be too self-assured,
positive, and hopeful.
Even in the insurance industry, of all places, we can be too positive
with our outlook and projections. In the 1960s, an actuarial expert
discovered that she “couldn’t find a single numerical probability of
insurance company ruin (namely, negative free capital and surplus)
other than in an infinite time span.”23 There is also the more-recent
example of the need for the bailout of insurance giant AIG.24
Presumably most insurance companies don’t do this. But when those
who protect us merely hope for the best, we are set up for the worst.
Risk enterprises, especially our greatest one, human survival, must
attempt to factor in all aspects of the stochastic model or process.25
Seemingly random risks can affect all systems, even in the ways
22. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008).
23. HILARY L. SEAL, SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES: THE GOAL OF RISK THEORY vii

(1978). Seal’s work pertains to the survival probabilities of insurance companies.
It may serve us well to remember that those companies operate in the real world
just like the rest of us.
24. See William Greider, The AIG Bailout Scandal: As Elizabeth Warren’s
devastating Congressional report reveals, the Federal Reserve used taxpayer
money to bail out the insurance giant, instead of forcing the major banks to clean
up the mess they helped create, The Nation (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/aig-bailout-scandal/
[https://perma.cc/4TSQL4UM].
25.
In probability theory, a stochastic (/stoʊˈkæstɪk/) process, or often
random process, is a collection of random variables, representing the
evolution of some system of random values over time. This is the
probabilistic counterpart to a deterministic process (or deterministic
system). Instead of describing a process which can only evolve in one
way (as in the case, for example, of solutions of an ordinary differential
equation), in a stochastic or random process there is some
indeterminacy: even if the initial condition (or starting point) is known,
there are several (often infinitely many) directions in which the process
may evolve.
Stochastic
Process,
[https://perma.cc/TVN7-2SFA].

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stochastic_process
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those systems are constructed and operate. Thus, there is a need for
regulation to protect against systemic risk. Although financial
systems contain and contribute systemic risks,26 we should not limit
the regulation only to financial systems. We need to cover all forms
of systemic risk to humanity.27 Ultimately, humanity will need to
consider its risks and opportunities, such as population, pollution, and
consumption—and make informed decisions.
We should not overreact, however, in anticipation of change. As
Sir Crispin Tickell points out, we need a clear assessment of risk:
“We need to make better use of technology and its myriad
applications. We also need to understand the hazards, particularly
[with] pollution. Risks are hard to assess. The short term must not
be allowed to defeat the long term.”28 There is risk in discounting29
and in its application to the future.30 As we need to protect the long
term, we may need to cease the practice of discounting.
The problem of risk to human survival did not develop overnight.
Our ignorance of risk and, in fact, encouragement of more risk is
long-standing. The late Ulrich Beck attributes this to temporal
confusion:
This organized irresponsibility is based fundamentally on a
confusion of centuries. The hazards to which we are
exposed date from a different century than the promises of
security which attempt to subdue them. ... At the threshold
of the twenty-first century, the challenges of the age of
atomic, genetic and chemical technology are being handled
26. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008).
27. Miguel A. Centeno et al., The Emergence of Global Systemic Risk, 41 ANN.
REV. SOC. 65 (2015). As we shall see, not all risks qualify for special treatment.
Only significant risks qualify. How do we adjust for the insignificant risks that are
on their way to becoming significant? We are likely to find that doing so can be
part of lightening our footprint.
28. Sir Crispin Tickell, Environment on the Edge, 59 MERCER L. REV. 719, 728
(2008).
29. “Discounting is just compound interest in reverse.” FRANK ACKERMAN &
LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE
VALUE OF NOTHING 182 (2004). One gets less by taking her money now as
opposed to later (when it would include interest).
30. See John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 43-48, 59-60.
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with concepts and recipes that are derived from early
industrial society of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.31
We need new tools for risk analysis that confront risk in order to save
lives.32 The implementation of new tools may be expensive.
However, this does not devolve into a matter of “Your money or your
life,”33 as posited by Cass Sunstein. Certainly this is not robbery.
We should view humanity’s efforts at risk analysis as a matter of
cooperation toward a greater common good for humanity.34
II. KEY FACTORS IN THIS APPROACH
Although humanity may merit survival, our long-term prospects
cannot be assured.35 We should be flexible enough to perceive
changes and respond to them.36 We need to be more vigilant and
look farther ahead as our rate of technological advance increases.
Our laws need to be flexible as well. One cannot anticipate every
possible scenario.37 There must be broader guidelines, and there
must be discretion. We have to prepare to be flexible enough to deal
with a wide range of significant risk, in different layers, angles,
shapes, and sizes. If too specific, law or policy can be insulting and
impossible to implement in a broad and equitable manner. As David

31. ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY 55 (1999).
32. For example, Carl Cranor suggests a public-health approach with testing

and a combination of actions at common law, injunctions, and licenses. CARL F.
CRANOR, LEGALLY POISONED: HOW THE LAW PUTS US AT RISK FROM TOXICANTS
178-207 (2011).
33. Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 2004,
at 27 (reviewing FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004)).
34. See FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI’ 116-17 (2015).
35. See Sir Crispin Tickell, Environment on the Edge, 59 MERCER L. REV. 719,
730 (2008).
36. “[N]ew knowledge can turn normality into hazards overnight. Nuclear
energy and the hole in the ozone layer are prominent examples.” ULRICH BECK,
WORLD RISK SOCIETY 58 (1999).
37. If we try, we’re sure to miss something. As humanity does not get “free doovers,” we should not allow possible risks to be excluded from view.
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Skeel and William Stuntz have observed, such a law can invite
people to try to break it.38
A product of our habit of finding quick political solutions to risk,
governmental entities currently legislate numerous “small laws,”
each in response to a discrete risk.39 Those laws chip away at our
liberty.40 The dynamics of fear have led to social and legal
fragmentation. That fragmentation occurs as we attempt to respond
to each particular risk as discovered by our risk society.41 Interest
groups cry out for specialized political solutions. We need to
overcome political neuroses42 and see a way to legislate for greater
purposes.
Either we need to be capable and willing to legislate toward greater
stability43 and then toward prompt action, or we need some general
policy language to help us process new and unusual risks. Although
broader language may contain loopholes, it is worthwhile to
remember that broader guidelines and policies demonstrate respect
for our judgement, give us responsibility, and therefore are more
likely to be followed. We need to balance too much specificity
against too much vagueness. We ought to look for ways to

38. See David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest)
Rule of Law, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 838 (2006).
39. See discussion of legal positivism in JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS
COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS 68-69 (2012).
40. Here is Australian Sandra Berns’s sociological perspective:

[I]t is important to understand the psychology of risk and the threat
nominally political processes aimed at minimising risk (and both
inflaming and allaying populist fears) pose to fundamental democratic
institutions, including the rule of law. . . . Because the ‘prevention of
bads’ has become an absolute priority, we are often blind to the price to
be paid for this priority.
Sandra S. Berns, Things Fall Apart, the Center Cannot Hold, 18 GRIFFITH L. REV.
53, 60 (2009).
41. See id. at 70-74.
42. See, e.g., Engin F. Isin, The Neurotic Citizen, 8 CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 217
(2004).
43. The human situation is currently unstable, and we are not yet in a position to
adjust to aim for goals.
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encourage creative and positive solutions to risk.44 We will benefit
by an expression of our goal of human survival and by recognizing
the earthly limits for consumption, pollution, and population.
Those considerations may not be enough. We also need to protect
our liberty, but not at the expense of security, and vice versa. At the
same time, we need to distinguish the rationality of the individual
from the reasonableness of the group. The thought processes are not
identical. The result will lead to social change. Humanity needs
social change—with a purpose. These are key factors in adopting
new risk filters to screen for significant risk.
A. Liberty versus Security: The Increasing Tradeoff
Humanity is up against a most interesting and contradictory
combination of needs. We have two very basic needs. The first is
security, freedom from injury and death by the acts of others.
Consider these words of John Stuart Mill:
Security no human being can possibly do without; on it we
depend for all our immunity from evil and the whole value
of all and every good, beyond the passing moment, since
nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any
worth to us if we could be deprived of everything the next
instant.45
Security is a long-term concern, and it requires a long-term
commitment.
The other basic need is liberty. According to USC’s Gregory
Keating, “Freedom of action matters because there are a wide variety
of things worth doing, a large set of values worth realizing. It is
therefore important that a diverse range of activities be allowed to
flower.”46

44. This can remind one of the U.S. Constitution, which is very specific on
structure of government, for example, but is malleable and has served so well for so
long because it is not too particular and is more about broad values, rights, and
limits.
45. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 53 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1861).
46. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 717 (2003).
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We need freedom to put others at some limited degree of risk.
There are certain actions that we must take as part of life.47 We
cannot entirely eliminate risk. However, we may be able to minimize
it to the extent that over time the risks to human survival become less
significant. Here is Keating’s take on the dilemma:
When we act we put others at peril, even if only very
slightly and even when we act with appropriate caution. If
we cannot put others at peril—cannot endanger their
security—we cannot act and so cannot pursue our ends and
lead our lives. Maximal security extinguishes liberty, and
maximal liberty extinguishes security. Yet substantial
measures of both liberty and security are essential if we are
to have the chance to make our lives answer to our
aspirations.
Liberty and security are both essential
conditions of effective rational agency.48
Keating points out that this dilemma resides at the heart of accident
law.
That same dilemma49 also resides at the heart of the law of human
survival. Security and liberty do not balance well,50 but we must take
47. There are at least two points here. First, protecting liberty may simply be a
matter of crimping freedom only where risk reduction is feasible. Secondly, let us
here distinguish between freedom to put humanity at risk and the freedom to put
the life of an individual at risk. A fully-informed individual may knowingly
volunteer for risk in order to receive extra compensation. However, the unwilling
individual becomes a victim and a means. As we are all different, each member of
humanity is unlikely to volunteer for the same additional risk. Justice requires the
exercise of informed choice, whether individually or by the group.
48. Id. at 676.
49. An interesting history of the dilemma in the American context may be
found in SECURITY V. LIBERTY: CONFLICTS BETWEEN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Daniel Farber ed., 2008).
50. If we simply balance liberty with security, we see the likelihood of biases
toward more security distorting a delicate and complex balancing process. See
Oren Gross, Security vs. Liberty: An Imbalanced Balancing, DE LEGE: UPPSALAMINNESOTA COLLOQUIUM: LAW, CULTURE AND VALUES 283 (Mattias Dahlberg
ed., 2009), also available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1471634
[https://perma.cc/D7XL-DTP4]. Some security should trump some liberty. In
what circumstances? For significant risks to life, liberty should give way to
support life. This relates to the ranking of fundamental rights.
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both into account.51 Both liberty and security, according to Keating,
“are essential conditions for the pursuit of most of the ends of human
beings, especially when we consider ends pursued over the course of
a lifetime.”52 Both liberty and security are needed for the life of
humanity as well as for the life of the individual. How do we find
both in generous and sufficient measure? Over time, as humanity
goes further into environmental overshoot, beyond our earthly limits,
our available choices in each realm will diminish. There will be
more conflict, and we should not be surprised to find that what
remains of a safe and happy overlap of security and liberty will
diminish as well. Unfortunately, as liberty and security each
diminish, each becomes increasingly corrosive to the other.
It should be a goal of our species to increase the overlap, to
increase the number and range of our available options that contain
healthy measures of both liberty and security. If we can successfully
return from overshoot, those choices would stand to increase. By
using self control to decrease human population, individual
consumption, and waste, and thus decrease scarcity, maybe we can
prove William Ophuls and Stephen Boyan wrong when they say, “the
golden age of individualism, liberty, and democracy (as those terms
are currently understood) is all but over.”53 Each, individualism,
liberty, and democracy, may be crimped by limits, physical and
moral, but there is no reason to call an end to any of them.
Ultimately, humanity may need each—individualism, liberty, and
democracy—in order to achieve security.
We can consider liberty or security at the individual level or at the
societal level. According to Keating, “questions of individual choice
... differ fundamentally from the parallel questions of social choice.
Individual choice is the domain of rationality, whereas social choice
is the domain of reasonableness.”54 We analyze choice differently at
the societal level.
51. Consider, for example, farming. Fortunately, we do not need to stop
farming. However, we may need to reconsider about how we farm, as,
cumulatively, current practices may be too destructive, wasteful, and risky.
52. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 682 (2003).
53. WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYAN, JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS
OF SCARCITY REVISITED: THE UNRAVELING OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 192 (1992).
54. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 677 (2003).
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B. Rationality and Reasonableness
There is much more freedom and latitude in the rationality of the
individual than in the reasonableness of the group. Keating explains:
“The canons of rationality ... give wide rein to individual subjectivity
and are naturally expressed in the language of efficiency.” That is
because, individually, we experience our own subjective notions of
well-being. We can run risks whenever we decide our expected
benefits will be worth our expected cost.55 But Keating points out
that “[i]t is not, however, reasonable for people to expose others to
risks whenever—by the potential injurer’s own criteria of value—the
benefits of imposing the risk exceed the burdens of having to bear
exposure to it.”56 The case of the Ford Pinto and the cost-benefit
analysis that led to fiery deaths proves this view.57
Rationality of risk imposition does not guarantee its
reasonableness.58 We value risk differently when we are the source of
risk from when others place us at involuntary risk. Therefore, when
we consider the risks of human extinction, some of us are likely to
find that more risk sources may reside with us than with others.
Some rational individual liberties may need to be curtailed or
somehow limited as the risks they bear may exceed the point of
societal reasonableness.
Notions of comparability59 can help guide us in the decisions we,
as individuals, make when we have an impact on the greater group.
We compare the risks. Rationality would have us look only at
ourselves. Reasonableness, however, would direct us to make
decisions for the common good of the group. The test is different
from the rationality test. Individually, we may often choose to risk
life and limb, but risking the lives of others on a grand scale is
different. Generally, we place value on our diverse activities that do
not require us to place life and limb at risk. Everyday there are
55.
56.
57.
58.

This is our own individual form of cost-benefit analysis.
Id.
See id. at 695-97.
For an example of the conflict between rationality and reasonableness,
consider the collision between the rationality of the anti-vaccine movement and the
reasonable needs of the community for public health. See, e.g., Amy Wallace, An
Epidemic of Fear: One Man’s Battle Against the Anti-Vaccine Movement, 17
WIRED, Nov. 2009, at 128.
59. See Commensurability and Comparability, in The Safe Level of Risk
Imposition (III.C) and Comparability, in Feasible Risk Reduction (IV.D.1) below.
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situations that present us, as individuals, with the opportunity to
make judgments of comparability. Keating highlights the conflict of
values when the value of the activity is pitted against devastating
injury when he notes that such “judgments of comparability are
difficult, contestable, and contextual.”60 Such comparability does not
involve simple tradeoffs, especially when it comes to fundamental
rights. Decisions will not stand up for long if they are based solely
on cost. Science tells us we need to reduce some individual
liberties,61 but as those liberties are fundamental rights, we need
something more to justify any reduction.
Reducing individual liberties may create new risks and not just
lessen them. For example, it matters who winds up with the power.
These concerns need to be addressed, but it will be more difficult to
do so properly if we are not mindful of the difference between
individual rationality and collective reasonableness.
Reducing individual liberties will not be popular unless losses are
softened and strong elements of fairness are employed. We may
need to reduce normative choices rather than reduce liberties. If we
as a group see an end as reasonable, then we can use that consensus,
with elements of fairness, to help the human family make individual
rational decisions consistent with that reasonable end.
Richard Falk suggests that “A rational use of the resources of the
world will have to take account both of the basic needs of mankind
and of establishing equilibrium between human consumption and the
capacities of nature. Such rationality has profound implications both
for resource priorities and for distribution patterns.”62 Rationally, we
tend to hate taxes, but if the reasonable policy is to tax consumption,
especially consumption beyond a certain point, we as a group may
make that choice. One advantage of having steep taxes discourage
consumption (or, better, encourage thrift) is that there stands to be a
60. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 718 (2003).
61. See John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 58.
62. RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS
FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL 406 (1971). For more on fairness and distribution, see
Weighing Hardships: Fairness, in Feasible Risk Reduction (IV.D); and
Implementing Welfarism with Feasibility Analysis, in Feasible Risk Reduction
(VI.F) both below. This matter also arises in the context of property law.
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source of revenue to help with conversion to the most reasonably
efficient and safe technology available in such areas as heating,
lighting, transportation, etc. The transformation could lead to
employment for some and could ultimately be beneficial for all of us.
We can employ our rationality to help humanity reach reasonable
ends.
Let’s consider the reasonableness of the human risk situation.
Some may argue that we don’t know if there is an imminent risk of
extinction or collapse, or whatever might cause such significant risk
to ripen. However, with environmental overshoot in mind, each of us
can reasonably understand that decisions, or lack thereof, that lead to
an increased environmental footprint might theoretically tip the
balance of irreversible risk. If such risk were to become reality, there
would be a critical event at a critical moment. At the very least, a
number of critical events or conditions could push humanity in the
direction of extinction or collapse, past the tipping point. We need to
bring that theory down to Earth.
The deeper we go into environmental overshoot without making a
tactical correction, the greater the risk, no, the danger, of a severe
collapse.63 Even conservative jurist Richard Posner acknowledges
that the risks of global catastrophe are “greater and more numerous
than is commonly supposed. . . . growing, probably rapidly” and “to
a degree, convergent or mutually reinforcing.”64 The possibility of a
large drop in food production contemporaneous with resource
depletion (or the equivalent due to increased costs of extraction) is
real.65
If and when such a drop in food production occurs, war will likely
follow. Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update (LTG30)66 is
optimistic in that it does not take into account the environmental and
resource damage associated with war,67 bearing in mind that the

63. Id. at 137-39.
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 245 (2004).
65. The world is headed for hunger in any event. See LESTER R. BROWN, FULL

PLANET, EMPTY PLATES: THE NEW GEO-POLITICS OF FOOD SCARCITY (2012).
66. DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR UPDATE
(2004).
67. Id. AT 150.
Even just the preparations for war constitute a significant cost and risk. Princeton
Professor Richard Falk addressed this forty years ago:
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destructiveness of industrial war far exceeds that of earlier
generations.68 And yet, humanity has not changed how it enters into
war.69
Events at Hiroshima in 1945 and in Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan show no strong war prevention imperative in the nuclear

[T]he pressure of competing wants and the actuality of resource
shortage cannot sustain the continued misappropriation of resources for
the weapons of war. These weapons consume immense quantities of
scarce resources and satisfy no constructive human needs. As such, the
war system is the most spectacular example of man’s inability to put
the earth’s resources to positive use. The magnitude of wasted
resources is one of the most imperiling of human patterns.
RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR
HUMAN SURVIVAL 62-63 (1971). The destructive nature of war itself magnifies
our risk.
68.
If war were converted into a symbolic test of resolve or strength, rather
than as a mobilization of total destructive capabilities, it would not
constitute a threat to human survival, nor even a blight on human
existence. Many primates establish hierarchy and dominance within
their group by symbolic encounters, grimaces, and belligerent postures
in which the weaker contestant normally gives way without violence,
bloodshed, or death. Medieval notions of chivalry emphasized reliance
on symbolic encounters between knights at ritual tournaments,
although there were field battles, too, that caused a number of deaths.
War as it has developed in the modern world is an extraordinarily
expensive, inefficient, and self- destructive method by which to
establish relations of hierarchy and dominance among sovereign states.
RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR
HUMAN SURVIVAL 272-73 (1971). War is so expensive in its destructiveness that it
bears risks for all of humanity. If we can agree on the goal of human survival, it
becomes easier to find preferable ways to resolve differences.
69. Consider Hugo Grotius’s 1625 complaint of “a lack of restraint in relation
to war.” HUGO GROTIUS, PROLEGOMENA TO THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 21
(Indianapolis; New York: Bobbs-Merrill, Liberal Arts Press Book, 1957). We are
not much better now.
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age. With few if any exceptions,70 considering the consequences,
modern warfare seems to no longer be reasonable or even rational.
In the long run, peace will be necessary for survival, but it is
reasonable to believe that we need to do more than work for peace.
C. Social Change
Social change aimed at survival will most likely help in that
regard. As we think of doing more to assure survival, it would serve
us well to reconsider the behavioral norms of our societies. As we
increasingly go digital, our rate of change is increasing. We might
need to use that social change to help with survival. Economist John
Gowdy notes, “Most of the global changes in the earth’s support
systems have occurred since World War II.” Gowdy identifies “the
primary cause” as tremendous growth in global economic output,
especially in the north. But there is a flip side: “Economic indicators
have shown vigorous growth while most biophysical indicators show
an alarming decline. Understanding the conflict between economic
and biophysical systems is essential to understanding our present
predicament and in finding a way out of it.”71 Gowdy is right. We
must make changes in our economic systems—for human survival.
We can begin to do that by changing systems of risk regulation. But
many other changes are also needed to encourage the survival of the
human species. Some of those are social changes.
We cannot merely invent our way out of our human problem. We
need social change. It needs to happen in science, religion,72 and
law. That social change cannot come purely from technology. For
example, social media, like twitter, can’t provide the dare, the risk,
the commitment, and the reward that meaningful social change has
always required.73
70. One possible exception might be “Just War” theory (see Just War,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_war
[https://perma.cc/8SUP-3MFQ]),
but
political justifications underlie behavior based on claims to be within the rule.
Consider the second U.S. war in Iraq.
71. John M. Gowdy, Biophysical Limits to Industrialization; Prospects for the
Twenty-First Century, in THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY; PREVENTING MASS
DEATH AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43, 46 (Michael N.
Dobkowski & Isidor Wallimann eds., 1998).
72. See, e.g., FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI’ 121-48 (2015).
73. See Malcolm Gladwell, Annals of Innovation; Small Change; Why the
Revolution Will Not be Tweeted, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010, at 42.
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Corporations are part of society. They experience and create social
change as well. Many Western corporations are changing their
approach to environmental protection as part of their implementation
of risk management policies. One study found that corporate
environmental behavior in economically advantaged democracies
cannot be explained purely in terms of instrumental threats and
explicit obligations to comply with the law. An increasing incidence
of “beyond compliance” corporate behavior can be better explained
by looking at the interplay between social pressures and economic
constraints—with an eye toward potential future liabilities.
Corporate “social license” governs the extent to which a corporation
is constrained to meet societal expectations and avoid activities that
societies deem unacceptable.74 Those activities to be avoided often
relate to risks. Over time, that social license changes.
We already have a lot of social change. And some of it is already
quite positive. Ultimately humanity will need to implement survival
of the human species as a goal in social change. We have a long way
to go.
Social change is critical, but it cannot happen unless the risks are
widely acknowledged, considered, and accepted—and we respond
appropriately. However, we may not see75 or be able to respond to
risks which leads to what Judge Posner calls “neglect” of risks. In
his view the risks of global catastrophe are real, and neglect of those
risks is due to economic, political, and cultural (including religious)
factors. Such neglect, according to Posner, is “misguided.”76
What is needed is not so much a remedy for neglect as a direction
and purpose. We need to operationalize ways to find risks at an early
stage in their development. We can’t deal with risks if we don’t
know about them. We need education, and it cannot be aimless. A
worthwhile aim must be meaningful. Meaningful social change does
not happen on its own.
How to make social change happen is an open question. There are
as many different answers as there are people on this planet. No
74. See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection:
Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).
75. See How We Perceive Risk, in John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs
to Control Rather than Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016); http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 24-27.
76. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 246 (2004).
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doubt we need some laws to guide our norms. 77 It may be best to
remember the view of Professors Skeel and Stuntz that general
principles may be preferable to too specific laws or policies can be
insulting, impossible to implement in a broad and equitable manner,
and can invite people to try to break them.78
Due to these challenges, trying to make the necessary changes
through social change alone will be futile. How come? We lack a
principle in our law to deal adequately with the size (and nature) of
the risks we face.79 The size of the risks overwhelm our ability to
understand and to cope. Our law and our society do not have the
ability to deal effectively with risks of this size. However, the
problem is not limited to the size of risk.
Sociologist Niklas Luhmann argues that the number and breadth of
risk-related problems, many of them contradictory, have come to
confuse and overwhelm our collective ability to analyze and then to
respond. The complications exceed our social systems’ abilities, but
what is worse, they are contradictory. As Luhmann notes, “The
social system is steering a course in which everything is possible and
nothing is attainable any longer—namely, where every change is
legitimate, but conflicts by way of realization sooner or later with
equally justified counter-positions.”80 The problem of rapidly
changing political positions comes as a result of a long series of
positivist (political) choices. In the process, we have become
disconnected from our historical and moral roots,81 and given
humanity’s conflicting interests and goals, we encounter increasing
contradictions. Those contradictions can lead to gridlock.82 Without
77. Certainly social change can be legislatively mandated or even judicially
determined (with significant impediments and marginal results). See, e.g., GERALD
N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991). However, it would be best if members of human society could consciously
decide to change rather than have social change forced upon them.
78. See David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest)
Rule of Law, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 838 (2006).
79. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 232 (Martin
Albrow ed., Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985).
80. Id.
81. See Harold J. Berman, Religious Foundations of Law in the West: An
Historical Perspective, 1 J. L. & RELIGION 3, 37-39 (1983).
82. Consider, e.g., the war on drugs, and the increasing concerns about its social
and fiscal costs. Consider also those entities that may be deemed too big to fail.
We live in gridlock, with no principle in sight for resolution. “The problem resides
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a unifying principle or goal, we find more and more fine distinctions
and less and less that brings us together.
Gridlock is the inability of groups to agree on what the common
good is, let alone how to cooperate to get there. It may manifest
itself as political gridlock.83 Selfishness is one cause.84 Whether
social or political, gridlock will not help humanity succeed.
Generally, the law is not equipped to change gridlock. Aside from
social change, what is available to help us with this problem in the
law?
Let’s return to the theory of risk. In consideration of devastating
injury and fair precaution, the use of neo-classical economics and its
tool, unrestricted cost-benefit analysis, should be curtailed.85 How
should we replace that tool? We need one that affords us more
precaution.
As Professor Keating begins to make a moral case for a level of
precaution that CBA cannot reach, he identifies four characteristics
of relevant risk. First, standards are designed to protect from
devastating or life-threatening injury, injury both severe and
irreparable. Secondly, the injuries are avoidable. Thirdly, the risks
are produced by a category of activity that society requires and
cannot generally be avoided. And finally, “the risks governed by
these standards are certain to ripen into some incidence of the harms
risked.”86 Keating’s focus is on industrial accidents and not the
ultimate catastrophic risk. Hopefully, and presumably, there is
in the mediation of necessarily one-sided innovations with static, rather than
dynamic, system situations by aid of adequately abstract categories which are
meaningful in the long term.” NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF
LAW 232 (Martin Albrow ed., Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985). For
another perspective of gridlock, see MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY:
HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS
LIVES (2008).
83. See THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD, AND KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY
GLOBAL COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST 16 (2013); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2013).
84. See Steven Callander & Keith Krehbiel, Gridlock and Delegation in a
Changing World, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 819, 820 (2014).
85. John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than Follow
Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 64-66.
86. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 665 (2003).
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nothing in the realm of survival that would preclude this level of
precaution from application to the catastrophic risks we create. New
levels of precaution should help us begin to navigate our current
social gridlock.
Besides cost justification (which tolerates the most risk), there are
at least two other levels of legal risk standards: feasible reduction and
safety standards of risk imposition. These well-defined standards, in
Keating’s view, “identify distinct levels of permissible risk
imposition, and they stand in linear, vertical relation to one
another.”87 They lock into the same system and work together. We
will explore each in greater depth.
III. THE SAFE LEVEL OF RISK IMPOSITION
Let’s begin with Professor Keating’s description of the safety
standard: “The safe-level standard tolerates the least risk. Safetybased regulations require risk to be reduced to a point where no
‘significant risk’ of devastating injury remains. Applying the safe
level standard therefore does not require any inquiry into the costs of
risk reduction. All that it requires is a determination of the level at
which the risk created by exposure to the regulated substance ceases
to be ‘significant.’”88 How “significance” is determined will be
discussed in greater depth shortly.89
The safety-based approach is very close to the simplicity of “better
safe than sorry” found in the unmodified form of the precautionary
principle. If the safe-level standard is not another version of the
precautionary principle, it is the next thing to it.
We in the United States already employ the “safe-level” standard
for clean water,90 clean air,91 and pure foods. The Food Quality
87. Id. at 684.
88. Id. at 685.
89. See Significance of Risk, in Feasible Risk Reduction (IV.B) below.

90. The Clean Water Act was passed in a time of national crisis. The Cuyahoga
River had burned in 1969. According to Senator Edmund Muskie:
The whole intent of the bill is to make a national commitment…. Can
we afford clean water? … Can we afford life itself? Those questions
were never asked as we destroyed the waters of our nation, and they
deserve no answers as we finally move to restore and renew them.
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Protection Act of 199692 provides a good example. The Act protects
the public from unsafe amounts of pesticide that may be present on
foods, either fresh or processed. The Act requires that tolerances for
pesticides be set at a level that is safe. “Safe” means that “there is
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary
exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable
information.”93 What’s more, the administrative agency is instructed
to set limits to provide “an additional margin of safety” in light of the
special susceptibility of infants and children to harm from toxic
substances.94
These questions answer themselves. And those who say that raising
the amounts of money called for in this legislation may require higher
taxes, or that spending this much money may contribute to inflation
simply do not understand the language of the crisis.
CWA Leg. Hist. 119, 122.
91. The Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972
were drafted with deliberate indifference to any comprehensive costbenefit analysis that would set their environmental goals alongside
economic costs in a single master-currency.
Instead, drafters
established categorical substantive goals and noneconomic standards.
By 1983, all United States waterways should be clean enough for
fishing and swimming, and by 1985, all water pollution should have
come to an end. As for air pollution, the Clean Air Act directed the
Environmental Protection Agency to create uniform national standards
for six major criteria pollutants, based on ‘public health’ rather than
cost-benefit analysis.
Jedediah S. Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Restoring Democracy to Environmental
Law, 119 YALE L. J. 1122, 1181 (2010) (citing BRUCE ACKERMAN ET AL., THE
UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 165-207 (1974); 33 U.S.C.
§1251(a)(1)-(2); Mary Rose Kornreich, Setting National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 11, 11-32 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr.
& David P. Novello eds., 1998)).
92. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489
(1996).
93. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. I 2013).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (Supp I, 2013).
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Similar “safe level” provisions exist within the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 199095 and within the discharge standards of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.96 For
example, the regulatory aim behind the clean air provisions is to
“reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to
the emissions ... to less than one in one million.”97 Some residual
risk can remain after safe-level regulation, but it must be
insignificant.98 However, in this example, once the lifetime risk of
cancer crosses the line to exceed one in a million, the risk becomes
significant.
The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act were passed in the
1970s as national commitments to the health and safety of each and
every individual American. Then, in the 1980s, neoclassical
economics brought us cost justification. An attack was mounted on
the two safety-based acts. As Professor Jedediah Purdy sees it,
“Features of the acts that have come in for persistent and cogent
criticism, notably their embrace of unattainable goals and relative
indifference to cost-benefit accounting, made sense to those who
created them because they seemed to fit the statutes’ status as
national commitments.”99
According to neo-classical economic analysis, the Clean Air Act
should have been a massive failure. There was no weighing of costs

95. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2012); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling,
Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1553, 1582 (2002). A true safety-based approach to emissions control
could only be fully successful if it were implemented worldwide and not just in
individual countries. Consider the problem of regulatory exit.
96. The court in Hercules, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978) held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
“authorized health-based regulation of toxic effluents without consideration of
‘feasibility, achievability, practicability, economic impact, or cost,’ and addressed
standards for determining permissible discharge levels for such toxins” providing
they offer an ‘ample margin of safety to protect public health’” and “‘protect
against incompletely understood dangers to public health and the environment, in
addition to well-known risks.” Id. at 104, 111.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2012).
98. How “significance” is determined will be discussed in Significance of Risk,
in Feasible Risk Reduction (IV.B) below.
99. Jedediah S. Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Restoring Democracy to
Environmental Law, 119 YALE L. J. 1122, 1131 (2010).
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and benefits. Yet, when Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling
looked deeper, they found otherwise:
EPA’s retrospective cost-benefit analysis—a giant six-year,
peer-reviewed study—found that the Clean Air Act was
overwhelmingly beneficial to society. EPA’s best estimate
of the cumulative value, from 1970 through 1990, of the
most easily quantified benefits was more than $20
trillion—or more than forty times the total costs imposed
on society. As intended, the Clean Air Act made the
nation’s air dramatically cleaner, with emission reductions
as of 1990 ranging from 30 percent for nitrogen oxides, up
to 100 percent for lead. As a result, people were
dramatically healthier. Most of the benefits of the Act that
were quantified in EPA’s analysis consisted of avoided
deaths attributable to reduced air pollution.100
According to Ackerman and Heinzerling, the success of the Clean
Air Act proves “that it is sometimes possible to make very good
decisions without benefit of intricate economic analysis, and even
without attention to market mechanisms.”101 Safety has its place.
And quantification has its place. That place, replete with prices,
does not involve placing a quantitative value on the priceless.102
A. Irreversibility
There is a connection between the priceless and the irreversible.
Cass Sunstein notes the connection in federal legislation: “A number
of . . . federal statutes, especially in the context of public health and
the environment, specifically refer to irreversible losses and make
their prevention a high priority.”103 For example, section 102(c) of
100. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 206 (2004) (citing EPA, THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990 (Oct. 1997)).
101. Id.
102. There needs to be a respect or a deference for the priceless, especially that
which involves life, the most sacred of fundamental rights.
103. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 229
(2010) (citing “33 U.S.C. § 2712(j) (making special exception to planning
requirement for use of federal resources in a situation requiring action to ‘avoid
irreversible loss of natural resources’); 42 U.S.C. § 9611(i) (same exception for
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the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires
agencies to discuss “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be involved” in the implementation of any
proposed action.104 NEPA treats certain natural resources as precious
and irreplaceable, at risk from irreversible loss. “The central point of
NEPA,” writes Sunstein, “is to ensure that government officials give
serious consideration to environmental factors before they take action
that might threaten the environment.” Those factors are taken into
account with a potentially “burdensome and costly” environmental
impact statement. “But when potentially irreversible losses are
involved, and when officials cannot specify the magnitude or
likelihood of such losses, the public, and those involved in making
the ultimate decision, ought to know about them.”105 Laws and
procedures can and do recognize a finality embedded in the
irreplaceable. Delaying development, consumption, or use, when
there is risk of significant irreversible environmental loss, may be an
appropriate and reasoned exercise of a safety-based governmental
response.
Irreversibility plays an important role in risk analysis, specifically
in the moral view of risk. Irreversibility also arises as an issue in
safety analysis, otherwise known as the safe level of risk imposition.
This analysis takes a different perspective on irreversibility. Unlike
other approaches to risk management, the safe level of risk
imposition helps us attempt to avoid the irreversible. There are some
things in life that we cannot bring back once they are gone—
including life itself.
Let’s consider this irreversibility that we should seek to avoid.
Professor Sunstein identifies two ways to consider the concept of
irreversibility: seriousness and sunk costs.

Superfund cleanups); 22 U.S.C. § 2151p-1(c)(2)(A) (requiring President to assist
developing countries in a way that responds to ‘the irreversible losses associated
with forest destruction’).”)
104. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v) (2012).
105. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 229
(2010) (citing, Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(2002)).
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Seriousness carries with it the notion of a loss of awesome
finality.106 The loss of unique assets is serious because it is
irreversible.107 When Sunstein wonders whether there is really a
clear separation between the reversible and the irreversible, he finds
that “irreversibility is simply an aspect of seriousness.”108
Seriousness, or magnitude of harm,109 is another way to consider the
significance of risk.110
But taking life is more than just a matter of seriousness. Sunstein
acknowledges the connection between life and irreversibility: “Any
death, of any living creature, is irreversible, and what is true for
living creatures is true for rocks and refrigerators too; if these are
destroyed, they are destroyed forever. And because of the flow of
time, every decision is, in an intelligible sense, irreversible.”111
However, Sunstein trivializes life by comparing this most precious
attribute112 to rocks and refrigerators. This approach cannot produce
a safe decision filter in the context of human survival.
Irreversibility matters for the risks that are significant, not for the
insignificant.
However, if individually insignificant risks are
cumulative, exponential, or dynamic they may combine to become
significant. For example, if we consider the extinction risks of
excessive consumption, pollution, and population, the parts of each
106. Consider that the decision not to preserve a rich reservoir of biodiversity
such as the 60 million-year-old Korup forest in Nigeria is irreversible. When we
consider these risks through the eyes of Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal
we see that “The alteration or destruction of a unique asset of this type has an
awesome finality.” Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental
Risks, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 65, 76 (1993).
107. A big question is whether humanity can reverse our environmental decline.
Is it humanly possible? If it is possible and becomes a matter of will, then the
matter of irreversibility may lose seriousness. For now it is not proven.
Furthermore, we have no idea of the risks and the costs of attempting to (or failing
to) go back and forth between environmental decline and recovery.
Ultimately, we appear to face a conflict — and a choice — between industry
which, in its current form, tends to be too big to fail and a natural environment that
will fail when industry turns out to be too big.
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 234
(2010).
109. See id.
110. Sunstein sees this when he recognizes that irreversibility is part of a
“Significant Harm Precautionary Principle.” Id. at 235.
111. Id.
112. Life is also the most fundamental of all rights.
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risk individually might not be significant. But in combination, the
risk may be significant. How do we deal with irreversibility in that
context?
Sunstein also addresses the concept of “sunk costs.” Bad
investments can be irreversible. Once the money is spent, one cannot
recover it: “Irreversible investments are sunk costs—those that
cannot be recovered.”113 By using the money or item one way, we
lose the option to use it another way. The “lost option value is an
opportunity cost that must be included as part of the investment.”114
This, according to Sunstein, is the “economic conception of
irreversibility.”115 This approach tends to monetize, but it also
attempts to characterize that uncertainty involved in choice as an
option. Unfortunately, that choice is blind to the significance of risk.
Even when risks are all around, Sunstein fails to compare their
significance.116 Significance of risk is not part of option value
analysis. Thus, the “option value” approach fails to help us judge the
risks. If we consider losing the integrity of the planet’s life support
system versus losing an economic investment, and both are
irreversible, it should be clear which is more likely to be significant
for human survival.
In cases where we face irreversibility on all sides, how would
Sunstein make decisions? He elaborates on the “option value”
approach: “In many settings, it makes sense to pay for an option to
avoid a risk of losses that are irreversible in the sense that they
cannot be recouped. The amount of the payment depends on the size
and nature of the loss if it is irreversible.”117 Interesting proposition.
How much would one pay for the option on the ultimate loss of
human existence? What is the correct moral value?
Moral values don’t seem to count in Cass Sunstein’s view of
irreversibility. That may be because moral values are immeasurable.
Even when it comes to irreversibility, Sunstein’s measurement is

113. Id. at 236.
114. AVINISH DIXIT & ROBERT PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6

(1994).
115. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 236
(2010).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 244.
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distinctly quantitative, along the lines of insurance.118 His decision
procedure would measure irreversible losses against each other by
comparing magnitude and probability of relevant effects.119 As those
decisions may involve irreversible significant risks, humanity has
reason to slow down. If we are not careful, we may foreclose some
very important decisions. Given a foreseeable risk of global
collapse,120 our collective thought process needs to be more sensitive
to risk and more deliberate; the moral issues are more difficult than in
the past.
Where survival risks are significant, the option value approach,
focusing on sunk costs, does not make sense. Arguably, the approach
makes sense where risks are small and insignificant.
Sunstein uses a good general example of the problem to explain
sunk costs: the economically-oriented regulation designed to reduce
greenhouse emissions. If steps are taken to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, capital costs will be incurred, and they cannot be
recouped. Sunk costs are a familiar feature of regulation, in the form
of mandates that require technological change. We are often dealing,
then, with irreversibilities, not irreversibility.121
Multiple
irreversibilities may be a fact of life. We need an effective way to
deal with them.
Again, if irreversibility lies on all sides, how are we to make
decisions? Certainly, Professor Indur Goklany is correct to observe
that the precautionary principle itself, and presumably safety-based
regulation as well, are “not exempt from the law of unintended
consequences.”122 In the interest of safety, per Goklany, at all times
we must be aware of “both sides of the risk ledger.”123

118. Insurance would not be appropriate here. With insurance, one should have
a properly insurable interest. The moral effects of insurance’s quantitative
workings are incompatible with one taking out a life policy on just anyone.
119. Id.
120. See John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 7-22.
121. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 236
(2010).
122. INDUR GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 94 (2001).
123. Id.
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If, instead of focusing on smaller risks, we make the decisions
aimed toward our own survival, it would seem that we may have to
accept some irreversible investment losses in the interest of our own
survival. How are those losses to be allocated? Ultimately, the
market would spread them. But fairness and distribution controls are
likely to be necessary.
Fairness and the protection of regulation go together. When
analyzing regulations, as Sunstein does, the economic conception of
irreversibility emphasizes the costs of preserving flexibility for our
uncertain future. However, we miss the simple, secure, beneficial,
and fair idea of “safety first,” the very purpose inherent in safetybased regulation.
We are concerned with the irreversible and the incommensurable
for things like life itself that have a moral value far exceeding any
economic value.
Professor Sunstein explains his view of
incommensurability in the context of irreversibility of the loss of a
pristine area or of a species. When people talk about such a loss,
“they do not merely mean that the loss is grave and that it takes a
great deal to provide adequate compensation. They mean that what is
lost is incommensurable — that it is qualitatively distinctive, and
when we lose it, we may lose something that is unique.”124 Sunstein
notes the qualitative incommensurability.
Some things are
incomparable and even immeasurable.
We cannot line up all of our goods and values along a single
metric. Life is different from liberty, which is different from
property. Sunstein sees that life is too complex to be considered only
quantitatively: “If we see species, beaches, friendships and children
as equivalent to one another, or as equal to some amount of money,
we will have an odd and even unrecognizable understanding of all
these goods.” These goods are priceless and irreplaceable. “When
people object to the loss of a species or a beach, and contend that the
loss is irreversible, they mean to point to its permanence and to the
fact that what has been lost is not valued in the same way or along
the same metric as money.” 125 Like species, relationships and
relatives are not typically expressed in dollar values.
124. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 237
(2010) (citing Martha N. Nussbaum, Plato on Incommensurability and Desire, in
LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE (1994)).
125. Id.
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More particularly, Sunstein raises the foreseeable loss of a
significant percentage of world species from the warmer
temperatures of climate change: “On one view, what makes this loss
‘irreversible’ is that something qualitatively unique, without real
substitutes, will be gone permanently.”126 That qualitatively and
physically unique thing may turn out to be the life support system of
the planet. Irreversibility, combined with the incommensurable,
gives meaning to the goal of human survival.
Consider two conceptions of value: the economic127 or the
quantitative versus the moral or the qualitative. We cannot be both
consistent and complete in relying entirely on either one.128 Sunstein
says we should not confuse the two conceptions:
Of course, people are willing to make trade-offs among
qualitatively diverse goods, and they do so all the time.
We will pay a certain amount, and no more, to be able to
protect [family] members or an endangered species or to
visit the beach or to help preserve it in a pristine state;
public health problems threaten to cause losses of unique
goods, including human lives, but tradeoffs are nonetheless
made; we will not pay an infinite sum to see our friends or
even to maintain our friendships; we will take some
precautions, but not others, to reduce environmental risks
to ourselves and to our children. To say that a good is not
fungible is not to say that it is infinitely valuable.129
Is there anything that is infinitely valuable? Can we say that about
human survival? Or is the value of survival debatable? Should it be?
A good not being fungible is a far cry from the pricelessness of
human existence. Failure of the human species to survive would be
irreversible, incommensurable, and repugnant.

126. Id.
127. The economic perspective is essentially utilitarian. See Abraham Bell &

Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 543
(2005).
128. We can make it even more complicated by adding another conception of
value: the aesthetically pleasing.
129. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 238
(2010).
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A brief discussion of distribution is necessary next, as Sunstein
addresses it in the context of irreversibility. The combination of
irreversibility and incommensurability, in the face of a world of
increasing scarcity, sheds a different light on the issue of distribution.
Inadequate distribution in such a world, is likely to kill.
Although Sunstein’s work is admirable, and it’s easy to agree with
much of it, his argument that “the analysis of distributional goals
must be undertaken separately from the analysis of irreversibility” is
flawed. To Sunstein, goods don’t pose significant risks, but he does
acknowledge potential harm to the poor: “Sometimes we will hurt the
least well-off, rather than help them, if we buy an option to preserve
our own flexibility. The cost of the option might be paid mostly by
those who can least afford it.”130 The option-price approach is
focused on the price rather than the risk. Risk analysis that is
oriented first toward money is oriented toward property rather than
toward life. This is part of the problem.
The other part of the problem involves an inequality in the
application of the most fundamental right, the right to life. For the
poorest, paying the price of that option may, of scarcity and
necessity, be done only with their lives.131 The price is death to the
innocent. The taking of their lives is a significant, irreversible,
unfair, and immoral act. If it is done with intent, it represents a
criminal violation of the most fundamental human right. If the
killing is knowingly statistical, is it much better?
In many ways, for each of us, and in some ways for all of us, safety
regulation stands between life and death. The sooner we come to
accept this, and the sooner we make the necessary adjustments, the
better humanity’s chances will be and the fewer lives in being that
will be unnecessarily, irreversibly, and painfully lost.

130. Id. at 243.
131. If, when we see ourselves, our children, our friends, our neighbors, each

other, all of us, we see the face of God, we must realize that such distributional
decisions may involve the sacred and, as a serious violation of principles of
fairness, may mean death to the innocent. At some level, then, given the global
nature of the risks, we are all potentially “innocent.”
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B. Safety-Based Regulation
The regulatory nexus of human survival requires both quantitative
and the qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis may need to come
first — in the likely form of safety-based regulation.
Safety-based regulation has two defining requirements that, taken
together, distinguish it from other means of evaluating and reducing
risks. Risks must be significant, and costs must be excluded in order
to reduce risks to the point of insignificance. Such regulation would
require us to avoid those practices of risk imposition that place lives
of the unconsenting at significant risk.132
Some might argue that if we share costs, only the treatment of the
very gravest of risks can be justified—a most restrictive significance
requirement. However, even acknowledging and factoring the mere
existence of costs can serve to limit or skew the perspective and
interfere with the observation or calculation of risk, thereby
constituting its own risk.
Classes of risk may be treated separately and differently from
individual instances. “The paradoxical fact that the reasonable
course of action for a class of risks may differ from the apparently
reasonable course of action for a single risk imposition within that
class,” Keating notes, “thus explains and justifies the significance
requirement.”133 For example, driving one car does not constitute the
same significance of risk as driving 100 million.
132. In some ways, that would argue for the human component, alone, to be
considered. However, if regulatory risk analysis segments out only certain
perspectives of risk without considering the whole picture, including synergies, the
analysis is likely to miss some potentially significant risk.
133. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 707 (2003). He explains the paradox:

There should be nothing surprising about [the] discrepancy between the
reasonable course of action with respect to a single action and the
reasonable course of action with respect to a class of such actions. It is
as familiar as it is paradoxical. Consider the rationality of smoking
cigarettes. If you enjoy smoking cigarettes, it is always rational to
smoke any given cigarette. The odds that smoking any one cigarette
will kill you are trivial. The odds that habitual smoking will kill you
are, by contrast, quite high. If you think the odds of death from
habitual smoking are unacceptably high, it is entirely reasonable to
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Significance of a risk is one of the keys to determining which risks
to regulate with safety-based regulations. Significance distinguishes
those risks that may, in aggregation,134 be avoidable, different from
other risks, and subject to regulation, from those risks that are
unavoidable or irreducible.135 Many risks, even in aggregation, are
not significant, and safety-based regulation is inappropriate for those
risks. “Without the significance requirement,” says Keating, “safetybased regulation would require the elimination of every discernable
risk of devastating injury. But the elimination of all discernable risk
requires the elimination of all discernable activity. And the
elimination of all discernable activity is a cure worse than the disease
it treats.”136 The concern here is the elimination of liberty past the
make a habit of never smoking any cigarettes even if you enjoy
smoking and even though the odds that any one cigarette will kill you
are acceptably low. It is rational to do so not just because smoking is
addictive, but also because it is impossible to identify the single
cigarette that will kill you.
Id. (citing WARREN S. QUINN, The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer, in MORALITY AND
ACTION 198, 199 (1993)).
134. According to Keating, aggregation is a problem for CBA. Is it a problem
here, for safety regulation? Keating addresses the subject of aggregation as a
defense to a criticism of his significance argument for safety regulation:
Unlike the aggregation practiced by cost-benefit analysis—which
aggregates qualitatively different costs and benefits across different
people—the aggregation upon which our argument depends involves
only aggregation of costs within the same persons. It is the cumulative
cost of each prospective driver that can rise to comparability with
driving’s risks of devastating injury. Aggregation across persons
ignores the distinction between persons and sacrifices some for the
benefits of trivial gains to others. Aggregation within persons does not
suffer from this fault.
Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification,
56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 708 (2003). Evaluating our own risks and costs internally
is different from imposing those risks and costs on others in hope of securing
maximum efficiency or maximum societal income.
135. See id. at 718.
136. Id. at 707-08.
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point of significant risk, past the point of lifesaving. The significance
requirement is necessary to protect human liberty.137 Before
attempting to reduce a significant risk, we must first conclude that it
crosses the threshold that separates eliminable risks from
uneliminable ones. A lot of behavior could be eliminated. To
counter this, the significance requirement in safety-based risk
regulation is there, according to Keating, to assure that the “[o]ne
essential condition for leading a worthwhile life—liberty”—is
retained.138
It can always be argued that in a particular instance, a little extra
liberty is needed. Let’s say, for example, that we “need” (although
hypothetically auto travel has been banned) just one trip with the car.
Keating’s response to the request for such an exception is found in
fairness:
The fairness of insisting that some precaution be taken
depends not so much on the cost of taking that precaution
in the case at hand as it does on the cost of taking that
precaution in the class of cases to which it applies.
Practices of risk imposition, not individual instances of risk
imposition, are the law’s basic unit of analysis. The
requirement that like cases be treated alike requires this
general focus.139
The individual components of aggregate risks must all be treated
alike, in the interest of justice.140
Where humanity has control over significant risks, justice requires
a uniformity of rule and application. Thus, generally, we should bear
background risks141 rather than eliminate them.142 However, if an
137. Liberty is a fundamental right, subject to ranking below life and above
property.
138. Id. at 701.
139. Id. at 706.
140. The exception that may permit the automobile trip arises where not allowing
the trip poses a discernable, significant, and commensurable risk that is at least
equal to the one being avoided. What rises to that level? Examples would include
trips for certain food and healthcare, that which one cannot live without—and
cannot be made with less risk.
141. Background risks are those that occur in nature without any human
causation.
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asteroid impact is part of our background risk, and we are interested
in the survival of humanity, we will be compelled to attempt to avert
it.
How our rulemaking treats significant risks is important. We
return to the bounds of legislation; we’ll see this with both clean
water and clean air laws. Each has a regulatory structure. Due to
legislation’s relative inflexibility, as the underlying situation changes,
we can exceed the Earth’s limits. And in a fluid situation of global
risk, even though regulation may be more flexible than legislation,
any regulation may allow action beyond the planet’s physical limits.
Therefore, in many ways, for legislation and regulation, the issues are
the same. In the implementation of safety-based regulation,
humanity needs to be at least slightly idealistic or aspirational while
attempting to be more clear and precise in measuring the progress.
However, Duke’s Jedediah Purdy points out a problem with being
too idealistic with safety-based goals. He uses the example of the
Clean Water Act’s “wildly unrealistic” deadlines for ending all water
pollution: “Unreachable standards risked the impression of triviality
and farce and, more important for regulators and the regulated,
provided little help in navigating the middle ground between the
existing and the impossible.”143 Unrealistic goals can result in
confusion and loss of respect for the rule and even loss of respect for
142.
Eliminating background risk works greater harm to one of the essential
conditions of rational agency — the liberty to pursue our diverse aims
and aspirations — than bearing background risk works to another
essential condition of rational agency — the physical integrity of the
person. The costs of eliminating background risk are thus not only
comparable to the burdens of living with such risk, they are also plainly
greater than the burdens of bearing that risk.
Id. at 710.
143. Jedediah S. Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Restoring Democracy to
Environmental Law, 119 YALE L. J. 1122, 1181-82 (2010) (citing JAMES SALZMAN
& BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 127-28 (2003)
for unrealistic goals and the complaints and confusion they have occasioned, and
section 112 of the Clean Air Act as a specific example. Section 112 directed
essentially a safe level of risk imposition in a situation arguably calling for only
feasible risk reduction.)
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the process. More administrative precision of measurement and
flexibility in the design of incentive and rule are called for. As
situations change, rules may need to change with, or even ahead of
them,144 in real time.
Still, rules with lofty goals are important. Symbolism in legislation
and regulation is important. In the debates on the Clean Air Act, for
example, there was, says Purdy, an express need to involve the public
in accepting new costs, in reducing consumption, and in taking
“independent action to enforce pollution controls.” Americans were
asked to change the way they thought about their air. There was a
need requiring “civic, as well as technological, mobilization.” 145
Such a change in thought can be achieved by intention. Goals can be
wonderfully worthwhile. But the goals must address significant
risks, and the goals must ultimately be reachable. For safety
regulation to work, the risks must be eliminable, and we must be able
to live without them.
We now use safety-based analysis in limited areas, and we need to
expand it. “Safety first” risk analysis appears in the current
governance system in construction and heavy manufacturing,
inherently dangerous work. Scientific risk assessment is often not
part of normal regulatory decision-making. Certainly not at the
highest levels. Humanity needs to move risk analysis, safety-based
risk analysis questions, decisions, and implementation of measures of
worldwide significance to the highest levels of government. Given
the significance and irreversibility of risks that foreseeably could
affect all of us, why not?
To date, according to Gregory Keating, safety-based regulations
have been designed to protect limited populations: “The emphasis on
those most exposed to risk or those most susceptible to it—those
most disadvantaged by the risks being regulated—is a recurring
theme in safety-based regulation.”146 But this practice may not be
sufficient in the realm of threats to human survival. How can one
limit the emphasis to those most at risk when we are all at risk
144. While rules may change easily to meet reality, principles are another matter.
Humanity must use principles to address the most significant risks.
145. Jedediah S. Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Restoring Democracy to
Environmental Law, 119 YALE L. J. 1122, 1187 (2010) (citing CAA Leg. Hist. 149,
258, 335-36 and Clean Air and Autos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1973, at 26).
146. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 686 (2003).
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together? Humanity should focus on risks rather than on identifying
those at risk. Safety-based regulation can be scaled to face even the
greatest risks, and if it is implemented globally, there will be no
regulatory exit or free-riding.
C. Commensurability and Comparability
Costs are not always monetary. For safety-based regulation and
the underlying theory of the safe level of risk imposition,
consideration of costs are excluded entirely. Safety, not efficiency,
utility, happiness, or greed, is the prime consideration.147 The safety
considerations that protect life and health are incommensurable with
other considerations. Keating highlights the incommensurability by
comparing the approaches of CBA and safety-based regulation: “To
determine an appropriate level of safety, cost-benefit analysis insists
on balancing all relevant considerations (as it conceives them) in a
comprehensive calculus. Safety-based regulation insists on excluding
an entire class of arguably relevant reasons—namely, costs—from
the exercise of fixing an acceptable level of risk.”148 Safety is
considered exclusively.
For significant risks, it is the only
consideration because the costs on the other side are not at all
commensurable with the life and health safety protects. Life and
health are not fungible at some ratio of exchange with liberty or with
property.
Efforts to implement a safety system of regulation are sometimes
viewed as overly rigid and even Utopian. Holding to a standard of
protecting life over liberty and property may be too difficult for many
of us. An expectation of perfection may overwhelm. So also might
the feeling of incessant obligation. In such situations, according to
Professor Carol Rose, “second best may be the best that we can do.”
149
However, safety considerations on the road to survival may
require better than second best.
147. “[A] reasonable legislature should reject the central idea of unrestricted
cost-benefit analysis — that all goods are commensurable, fungible at some ratio of
exchange. Statutes like the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 reject this idea of
universal commensurability. They implicitly single out health for special
protection.” Id. at 719.
148. Id. at 709.
149. See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1897, 1926 (2007).

340

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVII

Professor Keating argues that “[w]e should eliminate significant
risks of injury when the costs of doing so are not comparable to the
devastation that significant risks are sure to wreak. This ... suggests a
division of labor between safety- and feasibility-based risk
regulation.”150 We’ll be returning to feasible risk reduction in a
moment. The point here is that when one pursues risk reduction to
the point of insignificance, issues of incommensurability evaporate.
Although it may seem that the costs become comparable, the focus is
on risk, not on costs.151 Once risks to life and health are reduced to
the point of insignificance, they may be replaced by considerations of
liberty and possibly even by considerations of property—until the
point where risk becomes significant again.
As we consider the prospect of human extinction, would the
rational person or the reasonable group find any significant risk
acceptable?152 They would find that risk acceptable only in the
instance where the risks (death or destruction of civilization) are
comparable153 on both sides of the equation.154 Very few things are
comparable to life itself.
Keating says that “[c]omparability is, in fact, at its least
problematic when the harm threatened by risk reduction is identical

150. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 709 (2003) (emphasis added). See also id. at
718-19. Both types of risk regulation would also allow for equity-based regulation.
See Implementing Welfarism With Feasibility Analysis, in Feasible Risk Reduction
(IV.F) below. There is also the potential for other necessary filters beyond risk and
equity.
151. The implementation of safety-based risk regulation does not mean that
regulation stops when the costs are too great, though costs are easier to fathom than
risk. Costs are not considered until significant risk is eliminated.
152. Significance is not measured. It is qualitative rather than quantitative. See
Significance of Risk, in Feasible Risk Reduction (IV.B) below.
153. “Harms are comparable when they disrupt the lives of those they affect in
similarly urgent (or insignificant) ways — when they impair ordinary activities, or
the pursuit of rational life plans, in similar ways. Burdens and benefits are
comparable when they improve or impair lives in similarly urgent or insignificant
ways. . . . [H]arms are comparable when they strike at the preconditions of
rational agency in similarly severe (or similarly mild) ways.” Gregory C. Keating,
Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653,
710 (2003).
154. “Health should only be sacrificed when we stand to gain more of something
comparable.” Id. at 719.
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to the harm threatened by the risk at hand.”155 When we weigh life
against life, liberty against liberty, or property against property, we
approach identity. Some things are qualitatively closer than others.
In instances of an identity, it may be appropriate to invoke feasibility
analysis (discussed below) instead of the safety standard.
Social and historical considerations have led us to weigh some
goods more heavily than others. Keating uses the example of food:
“The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, for example, implicitly
rests on the particular, historically contingent claim that more yield
per acre of crop planted is not a good comparable to a significant risk
of irreparable health injury.” We value health over food quantity
because, he argues, “health is, for each of us, an essential condition
of effective agency whereas the benefits of increasing the yield of the
crop per acre are not—for us—measured in the attainment of an
equally essential good.”156 Health is the next thing to life itself.
At this time, we in the United States do not value crop per acre, or
the amount of available food, more highly than our own health. With
increasing demands for ethanol; meat production for omnivores,
carnivores, and pets;157 and grain for export to replace exhausted
water supplies in Africa, the Middle East, India, and China, that may
change. If humanity ever gets so hungry that we give up health
standards, our safety, in order to eat, we are in deep trouble.
The same principle we use for pure food holds true for clean air
and water. Our health is at risk. And for the affluent of the global
West, the cost of air and water regulatory protection is not
155. Id. at 717. Is human extinction or collapse “at hand”? How close does it
have to be? If it should be treated as being at hand, how long should we do so?
Until we are no longer in environmental overshoot? Or until we have remediated
the effects of overshoot? A combination of goals, the goals implicit in a greater
goal and information in the form of feedback are likely to be the keys to
determining new collective behavioral norms.
156. Id. at 719.
157. See ROBERT & BRENDA VALE, TIME TO EAT THE DOG?: THE REAL GUIDE TO
SUSTAINABLE LIVING (2009); Kate Ravilious, How Green Is Your Pet?, 204(2731)
NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 24, 2009, at 46-47. One can only hope that, in American
culture anyway, we never get to the point of having to eat even one dog.
Population control of domestic animals may turn out to be as necessary and
important as any other population control. We love our pets, but many of them
have a substantial carbon footprint. In addition, those that are loose or feral have a
significant adverse effect on biodiversity. See VALE, TIME TO EAT THE DOG? at
234-35.
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comparable to the risk to our health from air and water pollution. But
in poorer societies, pollution may be an accepted part of daily
survival. Keating sees that “[i]t might, for example, be impossible to
reduce the risks of air and water pollution to ‘insignificance’ without
seriously impairing the ordinary productive activities which generate
such pollution, and that might make those workers most
disadvantaged by the pollution worse off rather than better off.”158
We might also begin to see these tradeoffs in the United States if
humanity’s survival efforts are unsuccessful. These tradeoffs would
mean giving up more than just money, giving up other aspects of our
health, in order to have air that was somewhat cleaner.159 Given
humanity’s trajectory,160 the longer we wait to explore and address
these tradeoffs, the harder these kinds of choices will be.
Different cultures may accept different standards for safety.
Notions of commensurability and safety, initially anyway, may vary
for different people and societies. But there is also the matter of
justice. Our species would benefit by working toward some basic
unified conceptions and standards.
IV. FEASIBLE RISK REDUCTION
We turn now to the next safest stop on the spectrum of risk control,
the feasibility standard.161 This standard tolerates less risk than
unrestricted CBA, but it allows more than the safety standard.
Keating, a proponent of feasibility analysis, states that “Feasibility
158. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 720 (2003). The impossibility of reducing
pollution risks to ‘insignificance’ without seriously impairing the ordinary
productive activities that generate such pollution — and thereby making most
people worse off rather than better off — is important, especially in greenhouse gas
debates.
159. Hypothetically, for example, in order to reduce the amount of carbon in the
air, we stop making charcoal. Charcoal, then, is no longer available for water
treatment plants. Without a technological replacement for charcoal to purify water
for drinking, cholera epidemics resume.
160. See DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR
UPDATE 17-49 (2004).
161. Another name for this approach is “‘technology-based’ regulation, the
essence of which is to require the best available methods of controlling pollution.”
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1581-82 (2002).
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analysis looks to achieve the lowest level of risk practically
attainable, not the level of risk that minimizes the combined costs of
injuries and their prevention, thereby maximizing the benefits of the
risky activity at issue.” Feasibility analysis allows us to do those
things only to the extent that we decide we cannot live without them,
even though they may involve significant risks. Necessary liberty is
recognized and permitted, but risks are reduced. Some risks may
disappear: “Feasibility analysis requires the elimination of significant
risks, when they can be eliminated without threatening the long-run
health of the activity to which the risks belong.”162
Keating points out that “The costs of risk reduction matter, but
only to the extent that those costs are sufficient to impair the long-run
survival of the risky enterprise.” Feasibility analysis enables us to
eliminate “[c]ost-justified risks . . . so long as their elimination is
compatible with the long-term flourishing of the activity at issue, and
significant risks remain only if their elimination would threaten the
survival of the activity.”163 The analysis recognizes that some risky
activities must continue.
We should want to protect the liberty to engage in certain
activities. In cases in which specific activities pose significant life
and health risks to the species, feasibility analysis may help us
eliminate that risk if humanity can find ways to replace those
activities with less risky substitutes. It is not always a bad thing to
threaten the survival of an activity. The emphasis, ahead of anything
else, needs to be on the reduction of significant risks.
Some activities are inherently unsafe, and we cannot make them
safe. Not all activities are worth preserving. Activities that represent
an inherently significant risk to human survival and that humanity
can live without should be eliminated by the implementation of the
safety standard.164 Other activities cannot be entirely eliminated. At
a certain point, demand becomes inelastic. Some risky activities may
be necessary for life and health. It is with these issues that humanity
should work both to reduce significant risks to the extent feasible and
162. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 685 (2003).
163. Id.
164. An example would be to ban the manufacture of CFCs not just nationally
but on a global basis. The logic would be focused purely on safety. A simple
calculus would determine that the behavior bears significant risk and that humanity
has substitutes or can otherwise do without those activities.
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to allow those activities to continue (unless significance of risk
increases with duration).
Feasibility analysis requires a series of steps. From a theoretical
perspective, first we need to identify significant risks to life and
health. Second, we use safety-based regulation to protect those basic
things we need for life and health, like clean air, clean water, and safe
foods.165 Third, for remaining risks, we need to analyze the
feasibility of reducing those necessary risks without crippling the
activity that imposes the risk. Here is Keating’s explanation of the
operation of feasibility analysis:
Feasibility . . . has two aspects—a ‘technological’ one and
an ‘economic’ one. Technological feasibility analysis asks
‘What is the lowest level of risk technically attainable?’
‘How much could we reduce this risk if we singlemindedly set out to reduce it as much as possible?’[166]
Economic feasibility analysis asks ‘What is the lowest level
of risk whose costs can be borne by the activity that
imposes the risk at issue?’ . . . Feasibility analysis looks to
achieve the lowest level of risk practically attainable.167
As part of risk analysis, the function of feasibility analysis is to
reduce risks to life and health first, and then within those bounds, to
maximize liberty of regulated behavior.168
165. This is the first of two safety-based operations. The second occurs when
feasible risk reduction successfully frees us from those risks we can live without.
166. “The frontier of technological feasibility is fixed not by the best present
practice, but by the engineering practice that might be achieved through a dogged
commitment to feasible risk reduction.” Id. at 688. A reaching aspect is essential,
or we risk becoming too complacent.
167. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 687-88 (2003) (emphasis added).
168. For the example that comes to the minds of many, would smoking be
banned? To answer that question, we would first need to answer whether smoking,
per se, represented a significant risk to human survival. If so, and if there was no
way to smoke without creating a significant risk to survival, smoking would need
to be eliminated by the safety standard.
Now, let’s say that scientists determine 1) that growing tobacco does not
automatically represent a risk to an adequate food supply, 2) that the damage to
lungs and the resulting costs of health care do not represent a significant risk to the
lives of unconsenting others, and 3) that the carbon released in smoking does not
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A. Feasibility Standards
Technological feasibility is the first of the two feasibility
standards. Technological feasibility requirements reduce permissible
risk and exposure levels to new lows. They establish permissible
standards and achievable goals within the limits of available time and
investment. As technology develops, standards can be adjusted.169
The technological feasibility standard can apply to the control of
water pollution, air pollution, human population, resource depletion,
or any other survival risk that could be reduced through the
regulation of the use of technology. The beauty of this standard is
that it is clearly workable, because it is currently in use.170
Economic feasibility is the other feasibility standard. Although
there is a cost aspect to this approach, it does not involve weighing
benefits against those costs.171 According to Keating, “Judgments of

represent a significant component of the risk of catastrophic climate change. While
life and health considerations cause humanity to want to reduce smoking, the
liberty interests of smokers require that smoking be allowed while risks are
eliminated to the extent technologically and economically feasible. From this
analysis, outdoor smoking areas and steep tobacco taxes are predictable.
169. See id. at 688-89 (citing opinion of Judge J. Skelly Wright in United
Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264-66 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
170. See Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 as codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§651(b) (2012) for the “most extensive application and judicial interpretation.” Id.
at 687.
171. Considering the costs is important to economists. Twentieth-century [neoclassical] economists believe it is critical to consider and weigh both costs and
benefits:
[Cost-benefit analysis] is an indispensable step in rational decision
making in this as in other areas of government regulation. Effective
responses to most catastrophic risks are likely to be extremely costly,
and it would be mad to adopt such responses without an effort to
estimate the costs and the benefits.
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 139 (2004).
This feasibility approach considers the costs in a feasibility calculation. However,
considering the benefits, placing a value on all human life, present and future, is
not only impossible, it’s morally repugnant. In addition, per Judge Posner,
calculating the risks is impossible. The successful use of CBA in this situation is
impossible and unfair. We need other methods to consider and address the risks
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economic feasibility require ‘cost-assessment,’ but they do not
require ‘cost-benefit analysis’ [CBA]. Indeed, insofar as the criterion
of cost-justified precaution requires less precaution than the criterion
of economic feasibility does, the criterion of economic feasibility
rejects the criterion of cost-justification outright.”172 There is no
CBA as there is no comparison of the benefit with the cost. In fact,
the test has no measure of benefit whatsoever, and, if feasible risk
reduction can be accomplished with minimal effort (including
changes in technology), there might be no need for cost assessment.
As conceived by Keating as a protection for workers, the economic
feasibility question is “whether the industry is able to bear the
cost.”173 The economic limits appear to be the point of inelasticity of
demand, the point at which consumers “can’t do without.” That is
the point in the demand curve where it becomes steep, where great
profit can be reaped. Those activities and goods that people can’t
live without can have almost infinitely high profit margins.
Typically, at that point, almost any costs can be borne.
Feasibility analysis does not measure benefit, which is likely to be
a matter of basic survival.174 Any and all of the various tests for
economic feasibility, therefore, would relate to elasticity of
demand.175 In the context of human survival, the protections should
go well beyond the workers in an industry.
Nothing prevents the application of both approaches, technological
and economic, together, to feasibility analysis. They often are used
and the costs that trouble Judge Posner and others so much. Use of the feasibility
standard is one such approach.
172. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 690 (2003) (citing Portland Cement Assn. v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); see also Frank Ackerman &
Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1581-82 (2002).
173. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 691 (2003) (citing United Steelworkers v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 n.102 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wright, J.)). This point is
explained in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (addressing the OSHA asbestos standard).
174. Fire engines and ambulances are easy examples. The maintenance of all
roads upon which they might run would be a more difficult case.
175. Neither elasticity of demand nor even happiness should determine how to
value human life or its life support system. Rather, humanity should attempt to use
elasticity of demand as a tool to improve the chances of a long-term human future.
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together, and when they do, they are used in the order presented here.
This dual approach to feasibility regulation is already in use in the
United States.176 It allows more liberty than a purely technological
approach. And yet this treatment serves to reduce, even possibly
control,177 certain risks.
Again, feasible risk reduction does not reduce all risks. It reduces
only significant risks as much as possible by finding the amount of
risk-producing behavior that humanity cannot live without.
Technological goals are considered first, but they are tempered by an
economic measurement of humanity’s ability to pay.
B. Significance of Risk
Not all risks qualify for feasible risk reduction. As with safety
analysis, feasibility analysis requires identification of significant
risks. Who determines significance? Sequentially, the determination
is shaped by legislators, regulators, and judges.
For legislation currently on the books in the United States,
significant risks must relate to health or injury. Feasibility or safety
analysis could also be used to protect humanity from risks to
survival. However, the risks must be significant. According to
Keating, “Unless and until such a finding is made, the requirement
that the risk be reduced as far as technologically and economically
feasible is not triggered.”178 He explains two required aspects of
significance: “First, the risk must be salient—it must be
distinguishable from other risks associated either with the activity in
question or with social life in general. It must stand out among its
fellow risks.” But there is also concern about the result. “Second, to
be significant, when a risk ripens into harm it must inflict a severe
176. See Keating’s discussion of Clean Water Act provisions requiring
“pollution control to the extent ‘technologically and economically achievable.’”
Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification,
56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 690-91 (2003) (quoting EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n,
449 U.S. 64, 76 n.15, 79, 74 (1980); Rybacheck v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1290-91
(9th Cir. 1990)). To additionally require a cost-benefit comparison would subvert
the intended risk reduction of the Act.
177. Imagine applying the regulation somehow as a brake. It must be robust
enough to hold up, yet it seems that it must be used in a carefully calculated and
predictable manner.
178. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 692-93 (2003).
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injury, a devastating injury, the kind of injury that seriously impairs
ordinary life.”179 This analysis applied at the group level would
involve foreseeable risk of harm to a sufficiently sizeable group.
How can humanity know if a risk is significant? Consider
Keating’s following analysis with the individual in mind, and then
change the focus to humanity as a whole:
[J]ust how to interpret ‘significance’ is a difficult question.
Is significance a purely quantitative notion? Maybe some
numerical threshold combining magnitude and probability?
Or is it a more qualitative and contextual judgment, one
which depends on the distinctive features of the context in
which it arises? Might the numerically same risk of death
be significant in the workplace, but trivial in an extreme
sport? May risks of equivalent probability and magnitude
in one sense—equal risks of death, for example—vary in
significance if one way of dying is more widely feared than
another?180
Risk tolerances vary. The same is likely to hold true in the analysis
of risks to human survival.
Although Professors Masur and Posner describe quantification as
“magic,”181 purely quantitative measures cannot capture the notion of
significance of risk. For example, in order to count as significant in
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, the risk of injury must
pertain only to injuries that are devastating which relies on a
qualitative evaluation.182 That qualitative aspect is one reason why
the notion of significance cannot be quantified.
Keating offers another reason why significance eludes purely
quantitative measures: “Significant risks are salient ones, and

179. Id. at 690 (citing Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
180. Id. at 693.
181. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 700 (2010).
182. See Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 694 (2003). That “devastating” standard
might not be sufficient to adequately protect the future of humanity.
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salience is a matter of standing out.”183 These are problems that
deserve and get our attention, if we are not in denial. “Salient risks
are prominent ones, risks which jut out in the context of the activity
subject to regulatory scrutiny.”184 But salience is only part of the
issue of significance. Keating notes that significance also depends
upon gravity:
Determining the gravity of a risk requires evaluative and
qualitative judgments—judgments about how much we
should fear a particular kind of harm or harms, how much a
particular harm impairs the pursuit of a normal life, how
bad it would be to live with that harm, and so on.185
In its search for salient risks, humanity may have a whole new use for
opinion polling.
By their very nature, threats to human survival, involving too much
consumption, too much pollution, too many people, or any
combination thereof beyond the limits of the Earth are sufficiently
prominent to qualify as salient risks. By their very nature and
context (their gravity), magnified by their degree of foreseeability
and by overuse of the commons, threats to human survival are to be
deemed significant.
1. Rethinking Social Norms
In the face of such significant risks, we need to rethink our social
norms. There should be a right against certain involuntarily imposed
risks.186 However, the environmental injunction has not fared well as
183. Id. It would seem that salient risks could be qualitatively or quantitatively
salient, conspicuous, or outstanding. This could be a quantitative matter of
statistical significance, that usage of the word “significance” bearing one of the
many meanings within the concept or notion of significance of risk. Might the use
of the term statistical significance in statistics benefit by being rethought? Does
statistical significance align fully with the qualitative and quantitative significance
of risk? In some ways, statistical significance has nothing to do with significance
of risk, but the similarity detracts by lending itself to possible confusion between
the two.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 697.
186. See John Oberdiek, Towards A Right Against Risking, 28 LAW & PHIL. 367
(2009).
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a means of protection.187 Other injunctions against risk may not fare
any better. Ultimately, humanity may need equity courts to protect it
and its life support system.
Let’s say those courts do protect us at some minimal level. Now
the questions get harder. To what extent do the courts support the
creation of new norms? Does humanity transform its energy systems
to use significantly less fossil fuel? What happens to the “Sunday
driver”? What happens to the oil dealer? What happens to the coal
miner? When it comes to new norms, the questions can get even
more difficult.
Here is one of the hardest questions: What happens when the
source of the significant risk is embedded in the practices of a
religion (not a cult)? The right against risk honors the rights and the
integrity of each individual. That right is a moral right.188 What
happens to that right in the face of other fundamental rights,
especially the “free exercise” rights of individuals in a religious
group that espouses a traditional way of life for its people? There
will be a conflict between traditions and new norms.

187.
Rejecting the idea that environmental violations should give rise to
automatic injunctions, the [U.S. Supreme] Court said that an injunction
is an equitable remedy, subject to traditional balancing, and that it
would ‘not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from
established principles’ permitting district courts to exercise their
discretion. In a subsequent case, involving the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, the Court underlined the point and expressly rejected
the presumption of irreparable harm in environmental cases. "This
presumption is contrary to traditional equitable principles."
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 240 (2010)
(citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) and quoting
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)).
Also, as we consider the importance of legal tradition and precedent in the face of
potential environmental violations, one can wonder whether traditional equitable
principles should give way to the environmental needs of human survival. If so,
what of property rights? If not, then through what ways can we support our life
support system—and what are the limits and how come?
188. See id.
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How should humanity determine its degree of precaution? By
public ballot?189 Who should define significance and how? As
already noted, the definition begins with legislation. But let’s
attempt to step further back, to consider the species in its broadest
sense—and legislation in its broadest sense. Perhaps humanity
would benefit by using a definition with the same general meaning
and implementation worldwide. Should this be a matter for a council
of religions? The decision would not only impact religion, but all
sorts of aspects of culture would be affected. Or should such
decisions be a matter for a council of governments? Or both? What
does fairness say about how to define the significance of risk to the
species? Arguably, humanity should have only one definition.
Implementing the definition of significance may require the
flexibility of an independent judiciary. Other branches should also
have a role: not only legislative and judicial, but also executive. Why
limit such decisionmaking at all? While we may need a structure for
decisionmaking at the global level, humanity as a whole needs to be
involved. How? Such questions can seem overwhelming.
Perhaps we should focus on responsibilities and goals rather than
limits. How should humanity set goals and judge the risks involved
in getting there? And how should humanity manage changes coming

189.

Invoking the public in the evaluation of new technologies poses many
difficulties. It should be understood that the public will become
involved, politically and economically, as protestors or boosters or
customers. However, the involvement is mostly after the technology
has become established. The future of the world’s people will be
shaped by new technologies, but there is usually no opportunity for
people to consider which technologies should be promoted, which
should be discouraged and how to deal with the consequences and
impacts of any particular technology before the impacts occur.
J. Clarence Davies, From Novel Materials to Next Generation Nanotechnology: A
New Approach to Regulating the Products of Nanotechnology, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES 545, 551-53 (Graeme A. Hodge
et al. eds., 2010). Nanotechnology is unknown territory. We have no means to see
the risks. It is likely to be beneficial to slow down and begin to feel our way ahead.
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from every direction? Feasibility analysis can help us with such
questions.
C. Feasibility Analysis in Practice
The theory of feasible risk reduction is very different from its
practical application. Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner190 are perhaps
the strongest opponents because of its numerous practical
deficiencies, many attributable to politics. Here, and more deeply
below,191 we will examine the practical use of feasibility analysis and
regulation. And we will see how legislative intent to reduce risk can
be subverted.
Masur and Posner identify two distinct types of feasible risk
reduction regulation. One type focuses purely on technological
feasibility.192 The Occupational Safety and Health Act provides an
example of Congress directing the agency to reduce exposure to
workplace hazards “to the extent feasible.”193 What may be
technologically feasible may not be economically feasible.
The second category requires feasible risk reduction and what the
professors characterize as a required comparison of the costs and
benefits of risk reduction. Their example is the Toxic Substances
Control Act, which directs the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to consider “all relevant aspects of the risk . . . and a
comparison of the estimated costs of complying with actions
taken….”194 This is not cost-benefit analysis. There is no weighing
of the benefits with a unitary metric. This is the economic feasibility
standard that we may use when we cannot afford technological risk
reduction.
With either feasibility standard, since 1981, if the regulations are
major or economically significant, by executive order, President
Reagan195 and his successors through George W. Bush196 and even
190. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657 (2010).
191. See (Mis-)Applications of Feasibility Analysis, in Feasible Risk Reduction
(IV.C.3) below.
192. Id. at 658.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2012).
195. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), 3 C.F.R. 127
(1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §601 (1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §601 (2006).
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Barack Obama have, through internal review at OIRA,197 required
administrative agencies to use CBA as an evaluation tool. As a
result, even when Congress has authorized regulatory action purely
for the purpose of safety, the regulations have been reviewed through
the neoclassical economic lens of CBA.198 Given the allure of such a
powerful wealth-generating tool, it is no surprise that presidents have
continued to implement CBA as a regulatory filter.
Thus, as all regulation is examined with the CBA filter, it is hard to
assess feasibility analysis. Even the critics of feasibility analysis,
Masur and Posner, claim that critics have never addressed feasibility
analysis “on its own terms” and that the test “had never been given a
clear account.” 199 They see open questions:
What does it mean to say that an agency must reduce a risk
to the point at which ‘widespread plant closings’ occur?
Can this term be given a precise definition? And why
exactly are widespread plant closings to be avoided? These

196. Exec. Order 12,886.
197. OIRA stands for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (of the

Executive Office of the President). For more on its workings, see Cass R. Sunstein,
The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (And Almost as
Many Answers, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 181-88 (2014).
198.
The executive orders do not require agencies to use CBA in violation
of statutory mandates, so their effect has been to more sharply bifurcate
agency practice. Agencies applying statutes that permit them to
consider costs have, since 1981, applied CBA more rigorously and
systematically. Agencies applying statutes that do not permit them to
compare costs and benefits, or that permit them to do so in a fashion
that falls short of CBA, now report cost-benefit analyses of their
regulations, but they do not follow these analyses and instead continue
to use feasibility analysis to guide regulatory decisionmaking.
Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
657, 659 (2010).
199. Id. at 661.
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questions have not received clear answers, with the result
that the debate has proceeded in a cloud of ambiguity.200
There may well be ambiguity in current practice. Yet, Masur and
Posner treat that ambiguity itself as a flaw in feasibility analysis. The
ambiguity stems both from a lack of standards and from legislators
using inconsistent language to achieve consensus. Government itself
can be a source of risk.
If the government is going to get it right, it will need to use
feasibility analysis differently. Consider the spectrum of what
humanity has done in practice. Our use of DDT nearly killed off
many species of birds. When our skies became black with industrial
smoke, it was initially considered a sign of progress. In protecting
against life risks, our major emphasis should not reside only in the
short term. Easy examples of life risks would include poisoned water
or poisoned food. We should extend our concerns to health risks.
For example, there are things that merely make us sick, reduce our
immunities, slowly poison us, or cause cancer in the long term. What
about those longer-term health risks? What about costs? How do we
decide which risks are significant and what costs are acceptable? To
date, we lack consensus. Governments, like much of human society,
are still learning the rudiments of how to deal with risk.
The goals of human survival and reduction of significant risks
thereto stand to help us see more clearly and find ways to work
together to more effectively address these kinds of questions and
concerns. Invoking those goals would involve placing special value
on lives in being, on the future of our species, and on humanity
having a healthy life support system.
We need the safety standard to protect life and the feasibility
standard to protect liberty. To get there—and to defend feasibility
regulation—we need to consider the structures and formulations of
feasibility analysis—and the assumptions and analysis of critics such
as Masur and Posner.
1. General Structure and Formulation of Feasibility Analysis
So how exactly does an administrative agency structure feasibility
analysis? Professors Masur and Posner provide the example of the
200. Id.
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Occupational Health and Safety Administration’s (OSHA’s) fourstep framework for feasibility analysis. Of course, the framework is
limited to OSHA’s scope of regulation, workplace safety. The
regulatory scope is not as important for purposes here as the steps in
the analysis. Here are OSHA’s four components to feasibility
analysis, as given by Masur and Posner:
1. Identify a workplace that is unsafe.
2. Define the relevant industry or industries.
3. Determine the technologically feasible (that is, available)
measures that can reduce or eliminate the risk.
4. Require firms in the industry to adopt these measures
unless the cost of doing so would cause widespread plant
closings or (in OSHA’s formulation)
a. Reduce industry profits by more than ten percent; or
b. Reduce industry revenues by more than one percent.201
The professors characterize step one as straightforward. Similarly,
the identification of a significant risk to the species is a starting point.
Whether it is an unsafe workplace or a significant risk to human
survival, each exercise of feasibility analysis requires an identifiable
qualifying risk to start the process. We will return to industry
definition and technological feasibility shortly. Importantly, the
focus of step four is not on risk control. Its purpose is expressly to
protect profits and revenues, potentially at the expense of lives.
Masur and Posner rely upon this rather poor example of feasible risk
reduction, and then treat problems with the example as an inherent
analytic flaw.
In their analysis of its legal background and statutory framework,
they explain the roots of feasibility analysis: “The term ‘feasibility
analysis’ derives from the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
which instructs OSHA to set the standard ‘which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity.’”202 In the
201. Id. at 687-88.
202. Id. at 663-64 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2006)). See Pub.L. 91-596, §

6, Dec. 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 1593. Generally, feasibility analysis allows an activity to
continue with the assurance that material (significant) health impairment will be
reduced to the extent feasible, technologically and economically. This results in
two questions: 1) Is it possible technologically to reduce the risk? 2) If so does that
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context of workplace safety, federal statutes make no mention of
compliance costs. 203
However, the statutory language of feasibility has varied. In the
context of environmental protection, Masur and Posner identify
several formulations, from clear feasibility analysis to those “more
akin to CBA.”204 For example, the Clean Air Act’s requirement of
the “best available control technology”205 is designed to achieve the
“maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant . . . which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs,
determines is achievable for such facility.”206 The professors note
that “while the statute references economic costs, regulation is
subject only to the limitation that those reductions be
‘achievable.’”207
Achievability could include a degree of economic cost anywhere
from zero to industry shutdown. Masur and Posner observe that
“proponents of feasibility analysis view the principle that regulation
must not trigger widespread bankruptcies as a concession to practical
Unfortunately, such concessions to
economic realities.”208
“economic realities” may well represent significant risk in the
context of human survival. Survival will require us to change the
way we live,209 and it may require some bankruptcies.
The professors take note of other formulations such as “reasonably
available control measures” (taken to include “reasonably available

risk prevention curtail the activity economically? Or more precisely, if economic
activity is impaired, how much of that economic activity falls safely apart from
significant risk? Impact on price or profits is not a consideration.
203. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657, 663-64 (2010).
204. Id. at 664.
205. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4)).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
207. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 665 (2010).
208. Id. (citing David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005)).
209. See John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 18.
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control technology”)210 and “best practicable” technology211 as found
in various provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.
However, as they observe, when Congress passed the Clean Water
Act, the “best practicable” language was supplemented with a
directive that the EPA
consider "the total cost of application of technology in
relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved
from such application." Another section of the Clean
Water Act directs EPA to “require application of the best
conventional pollutant control technology,” and in so doing
to ‘include consideration of the reasonableness of the
relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in
effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived."212
Masur and Posner see that the Act’s admonition to “consider the
reasonableness of the relationship between costs and benefits” when
choosing the “best practicable” technology is “best understood as
calling for CBA.”213 That is a reasonable interpretation. All the
variations make it easy to conclude that Congress has been creatively
inconsistent in the language of its legislative requirements for the
regulation of risk.
2. Modification of Feasibility Regulations
However, Congress is not the only group involved here. Once
enabling legislation has become law, the administration gets involved
in two different ways. First, an administrative agency crafts a
proposed rule based on the enabling legislation. Then in the
executive branch’s review of that rule, within the rule-making
210. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 666 (2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1)).
211. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i)).
212. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added by Masur &
Posner); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (emphasis added ditto) (regulating the emission
of pollutants classified as biological oxygen demanding, suspended solids, fecal
coliform, and pH); 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (detailing factors to consider when
establishing the ‘best conventional pollutant control technology measures and
practices’)).
213. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 666 (2010).
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process itself, there is a second action that is not part of feasibility
analysis as presented by the professors. The Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, by executive order, imposes an entirely new
and different style of legal restraint on all economically significant
administrative agency regulations—in a manner that, according to
Masur and Posner, is itself beyond review.214
One effect of the executive order is to pressure agencies to engage
in CBA even where that language does not appear in the enabling
statute. Even though the legislation authorizes a regulatory standard
such as feasible risk reduction, agencies also know that they will be
required to pass a CBA test. Such interpretive freedom is allowed
under the Supreme Court’s Chevron deference standard.215 As a
result, feasible risk reduction analysis tends to get implemented as
such only where Congress’s language is narrow and specifically calls
for that standard alone, and not in conjunction with any other
standard.
Effectively, to some degree, the executive order overrides statutory
mandates, but the nature of the executive order defies litigation. No
one has standing to sue over the internal workings of government.
Yet the action affects how the United States governs. Protective
rules get watered down through the use of CBA, and the
implementation of the Executive Order adversely affects our
collective and individual risk profiles.

214.

Under Executive Order 12,886, each federal agency must conduct a
cost-benefit analysis of any proposed regulation with an expected
economic impact greater than $100 million. These cost-benefit
analyses are reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), which has the authority to reject the regulation or
return it to the agency for further consideration. However, this
constraint is entirely internal to the administration: no outside group
can sue an agency for failing to comply with an executive order, and of
course no executive order can override a statutory mandate.
Id. at 667 (citing Exec. Order 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C); § 3(f)(1); § 6(b) (1993)).
215. See id. at 668 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984)).
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In the analysis by Masur and Posner, two important conclusions
emerge: 1) “the federal courts—led by the Supreme Court—will not
force agencies to use cost benefit analysis in regulating when the
governing statute appears to trigger feasibility analysis” and 2) “the
EPA – and likely OSHA as well – is permitted to employ cost-benefit
analysis in lieu of feasibility analysis as an exercise of its discretion
under Chevron.”216 The Supreme Court of the United States allows
agencies to substitute CBA for feasibility analysis even where the
statutory language has a strict requirement of technological feasibility
(“best technology available”).217
The Supreme Court’s implementation of the feasibility rule
undermines the rule. To allow the substitution of a money-oriented
rule, where a risk-oriented rule is required by statute, in the name of
reasonable agency discretion, holds the potential to replace
Congressional measures of safety with executive and administrative
measures of selfishness. But this is what the courts are doing.
Masur and Posner’s principal argument is that administrative
agencies should, when given the choice, prefer CBA to feasibility
analysis.218 Effectively, they favor using modified risk analysis to
maximize profits. However, when feasibility analysis is mandated by
law, it is not optional. Risk analysis requires risk measurement and
likely some degree of risk control, but risk analysis per se does not
require or even involve profit maximization. Now let’s look more
deeply into the professors’ view of the practical application of
feasibility analysis, to see their notion of risk reduction in action.
3. (Mis-)Applications of Feasibility Analysis
The way feasibility analysis is interpreted by administrative
agencies, from the standpoint of risk reduction, gets even worse.
Feasible risk reduction is conducted with technological and economic
analyses and without a comparison of costs and benefits. It is
worthwhile to take a look at Masur and Posner’s example of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

216. Id. at 669.
217. Id. (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505, 1510

(2009) (interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b))).
218. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657, 670 n.62 (2010).
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OSHA analyzed its own regulation of hexavalent chromium,219 a
compound that has been linked to cancer and other diseases that take
250 lives annually. As part of compliance with Executive Order
12,866, the agency conducted cost-benefit analysis.220 Afterwards, it
conducted a feasibility analysis. Masur and Posner describe the
agency’s approach:
OSHA policy required that in order for a regulation to be
considered economically feasible—in the sense of avoiding
widespread plant closings—it must not cause revenue
within an industry to decline by more than 1 percent or
profits to decline by more than 10 percent. . . . However,
OSHA reserved the right to except industries from this
standard under certain circumstances—to impose
regulations even though projected revenue or profit
declines would exceed the 1 percent/10 percent
thresholds.221
This is not feasible risk reduction, or even merely the component of
economically feasible risk reduction. This is merely one agency’s ad
hoc interpretation of economic feasibility.222 In these cases, the rule
was likely promulgated more as a matter of political feasibility than
as a matter of feasible risk reduction.
219. Cr (VI), is a predominantly manmade compound, used in approximately
thirty major industries, that is known to cause lung cancer in addition to lesser
ailments such as asthma, dermatitis, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal ulcers. See
71 Fed. Reg. 10,100; 10,104; 10,108; 10,166; and 10,174 (Feb. 28, 2006).
220. In non-fatal cases, values were placed somewhere between the cost of
treating the induced cancers and the best estimate of willingness to pay to avoid a
nonfatal case. Then they were discounted at either three percent or seven percent
annually. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 657, 672 (2010). The range of results was wide. See id. at 673-74.
Through this analysis, the most stringent feasible regulatory standard was “not
cost-benefit justified under any set of assumptions.” Id. at 674.
221. Id. at 675 (citing Office of Safety and Health Administration, Occupational
Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed Reg 10,100, 10,299-300 (Feb. 28,
2006)).
222. Someone has to set the standards of risk reduction. Who should? The
standards need to be organized and established at a level that matches the level of
the risk. Global risk should require global standards. Ad hoc standards of risk
reduction, providing for lower levels of protection, are subject to question.
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Masur and Posner draw several conclusions from OSHA’s
approach to feasibility analysis. First, they regard 1%/10% as the
general rule. However, they find a dozen instances in which OSHA
overrode its rule in favor of expected profit losses in excess of 20
percent.223 They cite this agency deviation from its own stated
standard as the first of three arguments against feasibility analysis, as
implemented by OSHA.
The problem, however, is not OSHA’s reliance on the feasibility
rule; the problem is OSHA’s variable implementation of the rule.
The statute requires feasible risk reduction, not CBA. If risk
reduction varied based on the implementation of a principle and not
on politics, there might be less to argue about.224 Could humanity’s
collective safety, as scientifically diagnosed, constitute such a
principle? Is our collective safety worth it?
Secondly, Masur and Posner claim that “OSHA’s exceptions to the
1 percent/10 percent rule are neither well reasoned nor well
documented.”225 Again, this objection pertains to a matter of
implementation, not principle. As they note, “On the whole, OSHA’s
exceptions have the air of post hoc rationalizations: having decided to
regulate, OSHA appears to have simply done the paperwork
necessary to clear a few formal obstacles.”226 Was the arbitrariness
of OSHA attributable to a failure to perform technological feasibility
analysis first? Even if technological feasibility was analyzed first,
economic feasibility should not be equated with political ends. The
politics of selfishness can be powerful, resulting in a distortion away
from safety.
The professors’ third and final objection to the way OSHA handled
the regulation of hexavalent chromium pertains to the possibility that
OSHA’s feasibility analysis may have led to a suboptimal level of
regulation, not just suboptimal from the standpoint of maximizing
profits, but suboptimal from a social welfare perspective.227 A more
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See id. at 679.
Note that feasibility analysis allows for acceptable costs to vary.
Id.
Id.
How does social welfare theory match up with the ranking of the
fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property? Do measurements of social
welfare simply represent a cumulative quantitative measurement? To what extent
is there a qualitative aspect to social welfare theory? To what extent should they
take into account the welfare of the group?
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protective regulatory standard was abandoned by OSHA in an
apparent attempt to save at least one particular industry.228 This
misapplication of feasibility analysis emphasized protecting current
jobs rather than continued production subject to feasible risk
reduction within a scientifically-determined level of safety from
significant risks.229 Masur and Posner observe that there is no
express basis given for the agency decision, and this in itself is
problematic. It is difficult to know what is optimal230 when the
analysis has been misapplied.
Masur and Posner also examine paper mill regulation by the EPA.
Here, the EPA used cost-benefit analysis to analyze feasible risk
reduction.231 In this application, CBA problematically takes into
account only certain232 human lives lost only in a limited, direct
context. CBA takes no account of the damage different approaches
to papermaking will inflict on our life support system, which is part
of the reason CBA seems to be so cost effective, easy, and preferable.
Some of the more difficult to calculate and expensive (even priceless)
parts of our existence, resources (such as clean air and clean water)
affected by those things known in economics as externalities, tend to
get ignored.
The EPA also proceeded with its feasibility analysis regarding the
removal of chlorine as part of paper mill regulation. After examining
possible mill closures, job loss, and bankruptcies of firms, it
considered three alternative regulatory schemes and chose the least
expensive in terms of annualized and net costs, job losses, and firm
failures.

228. See id. at 680. Part of the problem here may be a matter of industry
definition. We’ll see that shortly.
229. This is about implementation, not feasibility analysis itself. If the
implementation had strictly followed feasible risk reduction procedures, would the
result have been better? Better from who’s perspective? Economists? Business
owners? Investors? Workers? Consumers? The human species? Perspective
matters.
230. Optimality depends on the values we accept. In any event, true optimality is
never achievable. But paying attention to the values we accept is achievable.
231. See id. at 687.
232. Some people don’t count. For example, the United States routinely values
foreign lives at zero, by failing to consider them in decisions to regulate. See
Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499, 528
(2014).
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Masur and Posner find the EPA decision-making process
ambiguous, puzzling, and not well explained. But one of their
conclusions is that, “losses to consumer welfare do not play a role in
the test.”233 They are correct. Consumer welfare can be defined any
number of ways. Generally, in economics, it gets translated into a
unitary metric, usually a unit of currency. A single metric cannot
capture the preciousness of life.
However, in feasibility analysis, there is no need to translate into a
unitary metric. The analysis, instead, focuses on the matter of risk
reduction. Such protection might best be a matter of licensing certain
amounts (within limits) of certain kinds of activities, especially those
involving significant risk. In the face of significant risks to human
survival, how much should consumer welfare count and how?
Masur and Posner are correct to see the economic consequences of
feasible risk reduction. Those economic consequences may involve
significant sacrifice. The question is whether to worry about money
or safety first. Granted, a certain amount of money is necessary for
safety. But science now indicates that certain actions in support of
safety may be necessary for the very existence of our species.
How should humanity go about securing that safety? Notions and
measurements of consumer welfare must include considerations of
health and safety. That will require us to change the way we look at
and interact with the Earth, our only home. Our focus on efficiency
and profit in our limited world, where we are already operating
beyond the limits, is not sustainable. Maybe human existence should
not be quite so convenient and efficient.
We need to think about our situation as a longer-term endurance
effort. We must start to determine which things we cannot live
without. This could involve the use of tremendous willpower, and
that could prove to be tiresome.234 However, Lee Anne Fennell, also
233. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657, 687 (2010) (emphasis added).
234. “[I]n the short run at least, willpower works like a muscle that can become
fatigued with use.” Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1390
(2011) (citing Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited
Resource? 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1252, 1255-56 (1998); Martin S.
Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A MetaAnalysis, 136 PSYCH. BULL. 495 (2010) (providing a meta-analysis of studies);
Mark Muraven et al., Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion
Patterns, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 774 (1998)).
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of the University of Chicago, notes the flip side: “Muscles not only
become tired but can also get stronger with regular use; these same
characteristics apply to willpower. If exerting willpower makes one
better at it, then efforts to avoid temptations altogether may prove
counterproductive.”235
There may be significant rewards for using economic willpower to
reduce demand, as the reduction of demand would help humanity
build up its “economic muscles”236 and make humanity leaner.
Making that change would also help with transition to a different
level of consumption for purposes of sustainability.
Let’s return to our applications of feasibility. We need to more
closely examine the three steps in the process of feasibility analysis
as identified and developed by Masur and Posner. Industry definition
precedes the two types of feasibility analysis.
a. Industry Definition
Industry definition is the drawing of lines for purposes of
regulation. The drawing of such lines is, in and of itself, a political
act. If your company is not included in an industry definition, its
relevant actions are not regulated. Thus, the slices of the pie are
regulated, but the entire pie is not. This spotty regulation not only
happens at the local, state, and national level, within countries, but
those slices of state and national regulation appear even thinner, more
granular, or less important if the view is global.
Industry definition is a regulatory construct. Its focus is on the
industry being regulated as opposed to the activity that bears
significant risks. However, elasticity of demand and industry
235. Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1392 (2011) (citing
George Loewenstein, Willpower: A Decision-Theorist’s Perspective, 19 L. & PHIL.
51, 56-57 (2000); Emre Ozdenoren et al., Willpower and the Optimal Control of
Visceral Urges 20-22 (Resources for the Future Discussion, Working Paper No.
10-35, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1635350; and Siegfried Dewitte
et al., Self-Regulation Enhances Self-Regulation in Subsequent Consumer
Decisions Involving Similar Response Conflicts, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 394, 396,
403 (2009) (questioning the muscle metaphor’s assumption that self-control
resources cannot be enhanced in the short run and suggesting that task similarity
can produce short-run enhancements rather than depletions)).
236. See Siegfried Dewitte et al., Self-Regulation Enhances Self-Regulation in
Subsequent Consumer Decisions Involving Similar Response Conflicts, 36 J.
CONSUMER RES. 394 (2009).

2016]

HUMAN SURVIVAL, RISK, AND LAW

365

definition are linked in current versions of feasibility analysis.237
Industries that produce highly profitable goods for which there is
great demand may receive special protection, exemption from
stringent regulation, or a reduction in administrative agency
enforcement.
Masur and Posner acknowledge that industry definition is
problematic: “Industries do not come in natural kinds. Any industry
can be subdivided indefinitely.”238 They see that when the purposes
of special industry definitions are merely to “game” feasibility
analysis there may be a safety problem worthy of special attention.239
Administrative agency tinkering with industry definitions and
classifications is not so much consistent with protecting health as
with protecting corporate profits.240
One way to manipulate economic feasibility is to consider the
worst economic case and to lobby based on that case: “Infeasibility in
one industry may act as an effective veto of regulation of other
industries.”241 Another is through varying regulatory treatments
among different industries engaging in the same risky behavior, when
firms hide behind industry definitions. Humanity is likely to be
better off without industry definitions when it comes to regulating
significant survival risks. Our risks may be more attributable to and
identifiable with behaviors than with products. Regulations that are
activity-focused, or possibly result-focused, are more likely to lead to
successful risk reduction than industry-focused regulation.
The use of industry definitions does nothing in and of itself to taint
feasibility analysis. However, the misuse of those definitions, in the
interest of production and profit, can taint the results.
Thus, industry definition, the first step in regulating against risk
that may be feasibly reduced, is likely to be not only unnecessary but
237. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657, 688 (2010).
238. Id. at 689.
239. See id. at 688-91.
240. The artificial definition of industries in the regulatory context is not terribly
unlike the artificial definition of markets in the context of competition law. At
least some of the arguments against market definition appear to apply to industry
definition. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV.
437 (2010).
241. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 691 (2010).
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misleading and inappropriate. Industry definition can allow feasible
risk reduction to give us a false sense of safety. We need to be
concerned with the behavior—and the extent to which we cannot live
without it.
b. Technological Feasibility
Technological feasibility is the primary tool of risk reduction in
feasibility-based regulation. “Technological feasibility generally
means technological availability.”242 But humans are creative, and
with incentives, technology can change for the better. Masur and
Posner point to one of the claims in favor of feasibility analysis—that
such regulation can be used to encourage the improvement of
technology—and they say that claim is largely empty: “Although
some commentators believe that agencies may issue ‘technologyforcing’ regulations—regulations that oblige firms to develop new,
more effective technologies—in practice courts have placed a heavy
burden on agencies to prove that such technologies can indeed be
developed, and as a result agencies rarely issue technology-forcing
regulations.”243
By refusing to enforce technology-forcing
regulations, the courts are undermining the very feasibility
regulations that they are charged with enforcing.244 This is not a flaw
in feasibility analysis, but a flaw in its implementation.
The professors see other incentive problems, including a lack of
adequate incentives to change and a lack of adequate incentives to
account for the costs firms impose on third parties.245 These
242. Id.
243. Id. at 691-92 (citing David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of

Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, CostBenefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 13-15
(2005)).
244. Courts are backward looking, focused on precedent. Many regulations are
forward-looking, designed for the sake of protection. This difference could be used
to justify courts allowing a great deal of administrative agency deference.
245.
The effect of the technological feasibility condition is not only to
protect firms from regulations that might drive them out of business
(because they cannot develop a new technology in cost-justified
fashion), but also to entrench old technologies. Although feasibility
analysis does not eliminate firms’ existing incentives to develop safety
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incentive problems crop up when there is no consistent social goal.
A unified goal, such as survival of the species, should stand to satisfy
these concerns. Furthermore, these are not flaws in the analysis itself
so much as problems of human motivation. These problems need to
be solved separately. They do not constitute a bar to feasible risk
reduction.
c. Economic Feasibility
Economic feasibility is about whether humanity can have the
liberty to engage in certain behavior—as safely as possible. The
economic feasibility test is not about revenues and profits or about
job losses. In its full form, this step requires a prior determination of
technological feasibility of risk reduction. Then it determines the
extent to which that risk reduction is also economically feasible.
By worrying about investors and other industry stakeholders—and
not about more significant risks—in low-demand (economically
elastic) activities, however, Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner
demonstrate a preference for an efficiency geared to economic gain
rather than efficiency geared to using less. Their concern is
misplaced. To be sure, job losses, plant closures, and investment
losses may occur.246 Those ramifications are serious and important.
There are hardships, and they must be weighed against humanity’s
need to respond to significant risks.
D. Weighing Hardships (Comparative Significance)
Because the feasibility regulatory scheme was designed to protect
certain industrial workers exposed to significant workplace risk, the
weighing process has involved comparing the hardship of shutting
precautions that are cheaper than, but just as effective as, existing
safety precautions, it does not enhance these incentives. The reason is
that feasibility analysis gives firms no incentive to take into account the
costs they impose on third parties. In fact, firms have incentives to
avoid developing new technologies.
Newer, more effective
technologies might make otherwise infeasible regulations feasible,
allowing agencies to impose additional regulation.
Id. at 692-93.
246. See id. at 695-96.
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down certain activities to the hardship of the risks exposed by those
activities on the workers themselves.247 When we apply a similar
regulatory scheme to the protection of humanity, we look instead at
the risk to the species from significant risks caused by certain
activity.
The feasibility standard aims to reduce risk and, for those activities
we cannot live without, reduce risk without the complete cessation of
those activities. Feasible risk reduction also aims at lifesaving – to
the extent feasible. The feasible risk reduction approach is consistent
with both the preservation of liberty and the preservation of a future
for the human species, as it attempts to find the overlap between the
two goals.
When would shutting down a major productive activity work a
greater hardship upon all of us than would bearing the significant
risks of those activities? We can answer: When shutting down the
activity would impair humanity’s ability to survive more than bearing
the activities’ significant risk to survival would. When shutting
down the activity would make us all worse off, not better off, over
the long run. Think of the weighing within CBA and note how
different feasibility analysis is in comparison. According to Keating,
[Feasibility analysis] holds that we are justified in
accepting a level of risk greater than the background level
of risk—a significant level of risk—when our only
alternative is to shut down a valuable activity. The implicit
judgment here is that shutting down the activity is a cure
worse than the disease.248
Is shutting down all of certain types of activity ever justified? Masur
and Posner’s attack on feasibility analysis would have us make “a
concession to practical economic realities.”249
However, the
247. See Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 722 (2003).
248. Id.
249. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 665 (2010) (citing Union Electric Co. v. E.P.A., 427 U.S. 246, 265 & n
14 (1976); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 118 n.26, 121 (3d Cir. 1975);
David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory
Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005)).
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economic values of the neo-classical economist may not be the right
ones to ensure a future for humanity.
Looking at the problem another way, we can ask whether there is a
cure worse than possible human extinction. Since nothing is
comparable to or worse than human extinction, do we have to stop all
activities that pose a significant risk to survival? How would
stopping those activities change our way of life? Presumably, we are
smart enough to figure out a more effective answer to our collective
risk challenges than to go back to the Stone Age.
Weighing the hardships of feasible risk reduction turns on the
philosophical concepts of comparability and fairness. Let’s consider
each separately.
1. Comparability
Feasibility analysis extends the notion of comparable value to
everyday activity. And when we consider the various risks of
extinction humanity faces,250 everyday activity is exactly what is at
issue. Professor Keating’s analysis touches on this “everyday”
aspect:
Comparing significant risks of devastating injury to the
termination of economically productive, but everyday,
activities is plainly controversial. If we picture this
tradeoff at the level of an individual life, its merits are
uncertain. Losing a job—the consequence to those most
severely affected of shutting down some ordinary
economic activity—does not seem comparable to losing
life or limb or to suffering a health impairment which will
permanently and severely impair normal functioning and
shorten the span of one’s life.... We should, it seems, fear
devastating injury more than job loss. We are, after all,
more likely to find another job than another life or limb.251

250. See John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 7-22.
251. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 724 (2003).
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If we are changing the way we think,252 and changing the way we
live,253 then changing jobs and employment goals may not be that
difficult to accept. Feasibility analysis, applied to everyday activity,
helps make the needed changes all the more functional from the
standpoint of combining risk reduction and liberty maximization—as
long as we can accept that changing jobs is not as devastating as
losing life.
The case for comparability between cessation of a major economic
activity and the significant risk of devastating injury has three bases.
First, feasibility-based risk regulation accepts the validity of prior
market forces and valuation. Secondly, like safety-based regulation,
it accepts that historical precedent can be uprooted only at an
enormous cost. Finally, by treating major productive activities in like
manner, it assures an equitable approach to dealing with significant
risk.254
Equity is important, but arguably, survival is also important.
Threats to survival might come from pollution, or they might come
from mass hunger due to loss of jobs. Employers could lay off
millions of people and really put humanity at risk. Keating is correct
to note that “[s]hutting down most of the major productive activities
in our economy would be a harm comparable to bearing a significant
252. See Safety-Based Regulation in, The Safe Level of Risk Imposition (V.B)
above; Sir Crispin Tickell, Environment on the Edge, 59 MERCER L. REV. 719, 726
(2008).
253. See General Structure and Formulation of Feasibility Analysis, in
Feasibility Analysis in Practice (IV.C.1) above.
254. See Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 725 (2003).
The third and final idea involves applying the test of generalization.

If a remote risk of devastating injury is indistinguishable from many
other such risks, fairness requires us to eliminate all such risks if it
requires us to eliminate any of them. ... Eliminating all of these risks is,
however, undesirable. Some very low risk of devastating injury is the
price of activity, and activity is essential to the leading of any
worthwhile human life. The undesirability of eliminating all risk
explains and justifies the otherwise puzzling significance criterion
found in both safety- and feasibility-based risk regulation.
Id. at 726.
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risk of devastating injury.”255 However, not all activities are
necessary and comparable to that risk of devastating injury.
The risk from a single occurrence of an activity is not comparable
to the risk of thousands of occurrences of that same activity. For
example, a jet airplane provides inexpensive and convenient
transportation. Thousands of jets256 each producing tons of carbon
dioxide in a race to business and leisure, cause a much greater risk
than just one.
If the risks are not significant, it behooves us to let the activity
continue. If the risks are significant and morally comparable to the
risk of death in global climate change or environmental avalanche,257
then we would apply feasible risk reduction. If these activities are
not morally comparable to the risk of death, then we should limit the
activity to the point of comparability.
A surviving humanity will need to regularly re-examine
significance of risk in different contexts. Individual risks may not be
great, but cumulated or combined with other dynamic risks, they may
constitute significant risk. This demonstrates the deficiency of the
risk decision tree.258 The simple tree decision process cannot capture
all the risks humanity faces, especially the systemic risk.259 Instead
of ad hoc evaluations of risk, humanity should engineer decisionmaking filters. Feasible risk reduction should be part of the risk
filter.
Our blind acceptance of social, commercial, legal, and even some
religious precedent may limit our necessary flexibility.260 This brings
to mind a famous quote often attributed to Darwin himself:
255. Id. at 727.
256. There are 7,000 airplanes over the United States at any given time. Linda

Loyd, Fly the Privatized Skies?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 27, 2015, at E1 (graphic).
Many of those planes are jets. All emit carbon dioxide.
257. See John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 8-9.
258. See MARTIN J. REES, OUR FINAL HOUR: A SCIENTIST’S WARNING: HOW
TERROR, ERROR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND’S
FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY — ON EARTH AND BEYOND 132 (2003).
259. See Miguel A. Centeno et al., The Emergence of Global Systemic Risk, 41
ANN. REV. SOC. 65 (2015); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193
(2008).
260. See Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 733-34 (2003).
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“According to Darwin’s Origin of Species, it is not the most
intellectual of the species that survives; it is not the strongest that
survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able best to
adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds
itself.”261 Whether or not the thought is Darwin’s, it is probably true.
We become too tied to our past and not focused on our future. We
cling to what we know, and we equate the possible loss of that
behavior with possible loss of life and limb. Greg Keating shows us
the problem with this position:
Our mortality and [physical] vulnerability are fundamental
facts about us. ... In contrast, the importance to us of
various activities whose elimination would remove
significant risks of devastating injury—driving our own
cars, milling cotton, refining petroleum, having reasonably
inexpensive subcompact cars—depends on contingent facts
much less fundamental than having vulnerable bodies and
being mortal. Indeed, our attachment to any particular
activity is much more contingent than our need for physical
health and bodily integrity and our vulnerability to
devastating injury. The socially contingent character of the
particular activities to which we are attached might, then,
be proof that we can and should learn to live without
them.262
We cannot survive without our bodies, but we can live without
automobiles. We cannot survive without our bodies, but we can live
with less seafood in our diets (while fishing stocks regenerate). We
cannot survive without our bodies, but we can live with little or no
meat in our diet.263 If we consider fairness to others, to all of us as a
261. Leon C. Megginson, Lessons from Europe for American Business, 44(1)
SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 3, 4 (1963). But see Darwin Correspondence Project, Six things
Darwin never said – and one he did, http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/six-thingsdarwin-never-said [https://perma.cc/U27K-RAQ6].
262. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 734 (2003).
263. Consider: “Researchers at the University of Chicago showed that the meatintensive diet of the average American generates 1.5 more tons of greenhouse gases
per year than the diet of a vegetarian.” Joanna Pearlstein, Organics are not the
answer” (Inconvenient Truths), 16 WIRED, June 2008, at 159. Consider the
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species, we can change the way we think and we can change the way
we live.
2. Fairness
There is exciting new research about the origins of altruism and
fairness in both ourselves and in other animals. For example, if one
gives two monkeys hugely different rewards for the same task, the
one who gets the short end of the stick simply refuses to perform. In
our own species, too, individuals reject income if they feel the
distribution is unfair. Since any income should beat none at all, this
means that both monkeys and people fail to follow the profit
principle to the letter. By protesting against unfairness, their
behavior supports both the claim that incentives matter and that there
is a natural dislike of injustice.264
Fairness is considered in the context of weighing hardships.
Emphasizing fairness may not be the most efficient approach to
survival. Our market economy is more “efficient,” but it may not be
fair. Risk reduction has an element of fairness. According to
Keating, “Fairness requires that an activity which imposes a
significant risk of devastating injury be to the advantage of those
most burdened by it, in the sense that it reconciles their competing
interests in liberty and security more favorably than eliminating the
activity does.”265 Fairness also means respecting, honoring, and

benefits of eating lower on the food chain. Consider reduced concentrations of
toxics. Consider more food for hungry people. Consider fairness. Don’t forget to
consider simpler logistics, fewer costs (greater economic feasibility?) and fewer
risks (greater technological feasibility?).
264. FRANS DE WAAL, THE AGE OF EMPATHY: NATURE’S LESSONS FOR A KINDER
SOCIETY 5 (2009). “[D]on’t believe anyone who says that since nature is based on
a struggle for life, we need to live like this as well. Many animals survive not by
eliminating each other or keeping everything for themselves, but by cooperating
and sharing.” Id. at 6-7. “Greed is out, empathy is in.” Id. at ix. I plan to examine
the duties implicit in the fairness instinct in a future work.
265. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 735 (2003).
This concept of fairness has a definition. It is not the same as the fairness each of
us sees and experiences subjectively. With subjective fairness, different people
come to different judgments about fairness all the time. But with a definitional
approach, there is an attempt to aim for a unity or commonality of idea, a shared
understanding.
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preserving the lives and health of the unconsenting, those who would
be involuntarily placed at risk.
When we talk of significant risks to human survival, we all bear
the burden, the significant risk of devastating injury. Now, in theory,
all of humanity is together, weighing benefits and burdens. This
already happens in the context of the global marketplace. As Keating
points out, however, fairness is different from efficiency, and a
general background of fairness supports the same in individual
transactions.266 We need to establish a system of fairness in order to
move from efficiency and growth to a sustainable state.
How can we achieve fairness? We could require that externalities
be internalized or reduced in any measurement of costs and benefits.
However, such an approach may not protect us when risks are not
ascertainable or measurable. Also, as CBA is inappropriate to
evaluate survival risks,267 we should disregard CBA whenever costs
and benefits are incalculable.
Feasible risk reduction can take on an aspect of the common law of
strict liability which “requires that the risk from the product be
reduced to the greatest extent possible without hindering its

266.
The market vouches for the efficiency of the activities which flourish
within it, not for their fairness. The efficiency of market transactions is
assured by their being mutually advantageous (Pareto-superior) for
market actors, but the fairness of market transactions is not. Fairness
of market transactions depends on the institutional framework within
which those transactions take place. Market transactions are generally
fair when they take place against a just background—against a just (or
fair) assignment of initial rights and entitlements and a just distribution
of resources, both governed over time by principles which prevent
initially fair starting points from deteriorating into unfair distributions
of rights and resources. It is the sustained presence of ‘background
justice’ which vouches for the fairness of individual transactions.
Id. at 738.
267. See John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661651, at 50-66.
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utility.”268 In the interest of fairness, Keating might have us
implement common law courts “to judge some products—and by
extension, some activities—as not worth having, because their
significant risks of devastating injury are not offset by some
comparable benefit.”269 In the interest of justice, in the interest of
fairness, could the courts weigh feasibility as part of substantive
common law? If so, common law courts could better help with the
interpretation and justice of ex ante protection mechanisms.
Remember, common law damage solutions are ex post.270 They
will not help humanity with survival issues. Courts can help with
survival issues more through interpretation of regulations, and less
through assessment of damages after the fact.
If our species can use regulation to implement standards ahead of
injury (ex ante), to head off the risk, we are still intact. If the
regulations attempted to reduce externalities to improve our
precision, and if we also attempted to modify behavior through
gradations in taxation,271 we might be able to change the economics
of these activities, control their frequency and impact, and at the
same time, raise money to provide incentives for other necessary
behavior, some of it worldwide. Could this be possible?
As with any tax, there would be an infinity of ways to spend the
money. However, it cannot be politics as usual. Humanity must
consider going so far as to place its collective thumb on the scale in
favor of human survival.
D. Defending Feasibility Analysis
When we face significant risk, we should rely on a decisionmaking process that protects both safety and liberty. Currently,
because of our tradition, our norm, of seeking maximum profit, we

268. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 1982).
269. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-

Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 740 (2003).
270. “When risks threaten devastating injury—premature death or severe harm
whose debilitating effects can never be fully undone—redistribution after the fact
cannot align burden and benefit proportionally. Fairness must be done at the time
that risk is imposed, not after it issues an injury.” Id. at 746.
271. Consider Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax,
Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and Other Regulatory Taxes, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L., No.
1, 2011.
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rely upon cost-benefit analysis,272 which imposes its values, and in
the process of doing so, it distorts common—basic and
fundamental—human values. By appealing to our selfishness, it
obscures moral values, especially when we consider the values of
property (emphasized in CBA) relative to liberty and life (which are
more fundamental and are emphasized in feasibility analysis).
CBA obscures morality by causing us to consider what we could
have received if we had not played it quite so safely. It encourages
needless risk-taking. The premises and the values are misplaced
toward efficiency and property and not toward life, liberty, and
fairness. The assumptions of CBA are erroneous. However,
feasibile risk reduction still needs to be defended even if the
opponents are not on solid ground.
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner argue that feasibility analysis
should be rejected because it is ambiguous and it has unacceptable
normative implications.273 Unfortunately, their position is largely
comparative.274 The problems of feasible risk reduction are matched
against the efficiencies of CBA. When they dismiss feasible risk
reduction from the fortress of neo-classical economics, they are
merely advocating efficiency and self-interest, each of which turn out
to have significant side effects and risks. Unfortunately, the
efficiency arguments Masur and Posner use represent the philosophy

272. Although CBA was developed as a decision-making tool in 1848 (See
ARSÈNE JULES ÉTIENNE JUVÉNAL DUPUIT, ÉTUDES THÉORITIQUES ET PRATIQUES
SUR LE MOUVEMENT DES EAUX COURANTES [STUDIES ON FLOOD MANAGEMENT]
(1848)), it was not fully implemented in the American economy, sans the
corporatist philosophy of the New Deal (see discussion of corporatism and Adolf
Berle in William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99
(2008)), until the 1970s economics of Milton Friedman (see Leo E. Strine, Human
Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the
Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 257 (2008))
and the 1980s politics and administration of Ronald Reagan (see discussion of E.O.
12,291 in Feasibility Analysis in Practice (VI.C) above).
273. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657, 712 (2010).
274. We may find some difficulties inherent in feasibility analysis through a
comparison with CBA, but the difficulties will principally concern the position
against which feasibility analysis is being compared. To the extent that position is
flawed, so is the comparison.
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behind much of today’s manmade global risk. As the efficiency that
they desire is on track to kill the planet, their theoretical attack fails.
We have already considered Masur and Posner’s examination of
feasibility analysis in practice. We saw that the politics and the
inconsistencies of application of feasible risk reduction regulation
have greater impacts than any theoretical flaws in feasibility analysis
itself.
Only a few of their objections remain: Path-Dependency and TimeInconsistency, problems of Social Welfare Analysis, and the matter
of Finding a Normative Basis for Feasibility Analysis. Let’s address
each.
1. Path-Dependency and Time-Inconsistency
Masur and Posner point out that scientific discoveries can change
the economic feasibility of regulation after the fact. Enterprises that
have already been bankrupted would not have been, had the
discovery occurred sooner—or had the regulation been less
stringent.275
275. The example provided by Masur and Posner is illustrative:

Suppose that an industry produces hazardous emissions that kill ten
people per year. The industry has revenues of $1 million, costs of
$900,000, and profits of $100,000. Under some versions of the
feasibility approach, EPA should choose a level of regulation that
reduces emissions to the maximum extent consistent with avoiding
widespread plant shutdowns or bankruptcies. Let us stipulate that a
regulation X that costs $90,000 would save 9 lives and avoid
shutdowns and bankruptcies, leaving the industry as a whole with
profits of $10,000. Next year, scientists discover that this same
industry emits another hazardous substance. This substance kills 100
people per year. A regulation Y that costs $50,000 would save 99 of
these people but would also bankrupt the industry, which now has
profits of only $10,000. Accordingly, feasibility analysis would forbid
the agency from promulgating this regulation.
Id. at 696.
concept of
concept of
regulation.

The main problem for the professors appears again here with the
economic feasibility. It may be helpful here to remember the main
feasibility. The problem of feasibility is not one of feasibility of
The problem is one of feasibility of activity. The activity comes first,
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The path of bankruptcies seems arbitrary to them. They point to a
temporal arbitrariness of feasibility analysis based on the irregularity
of quality and timing of advances in technology: This “arbitrariness
that feasibility analysis produces” reflects the arbitrariness of
science,276 not arbitrariness within risk management. One goal might
be to try to align advances in science with survival, rather than with
profit, in order to attempt to address these concerns.
Masur and Posner argue instead that the best approach is to stall:
“Agencies can reduce the risk of path dependency by refusing to
issue regulations that consume a large portion of an industry’s
profits.”277 The trouble with such a refusal is that in many instances
then there would be no safety feature whatsoever.
Regulatory protections would look like Swiss cheese. For goods
and services with low marginal profit and elastic demand, costly
regulation is likely to have a greater impact on a larger portion of an
industry’s profits, especially where profit is based on high volume.
The goods produced are often ones people can do without. At that
point, because people can live without the product or activity,
production substantially ceases either to the point of feasible risk
reduction, or altogether.

followed by considerations of safety, followed by observations and measurement of
inelasticity. Weighting of significant risks and commensurability would appear to
be part of this last step.
276. Technological change may occur in “discontinuous leaps.” “Each crucial
invention is made through the luck or genius of an individual living in a supportive
society and probably benefiting from interacting exceptional people.” Eric Jones,
Technology, the Human Niche and Darwinian Explanation, in SURVIVAL AND
RELIGION: BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION AND CULTURAL CHANGE 163, 167 (Eric Jones
& Vernon Reynolds eds., 1995) (citing JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES
(1990)). As economic historian Joel Mokyr argues, “the economic history of
technology can be understood in terms of the Gould-Eldredge model of punctuated
equilibria” (Id. at 166 (citing JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES (1990))) in the
field of biology. Over the course of history, scientific and technological change
have tended to be bumpy. Eric Jones “urges that technological changes, including
the conceptual breakthroughs on which Mokyr places so much emphasis, did not
occur randomly but tended to emerge as societies ceased to select against them.”
(Id. at 168). Whether technological advances are random or the product of social
activities and conformity, the current randomness of technological advance is
unlikely to serve the long-term purposes of humanity.
277. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 697 (2010).
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If there was nothing scientifically specialized and particularly
indispensable about a product, Masur and Posner would protect such
industry from regulation as this industry would be at risk from lack of
relevant innovation. Such protections would most likely be removed,
then, for at least some activities of high environmental impact.
Wherever one would find significant elasticity, greater quantities and
relatively low per-unit profits would be at risk, and therefore feasible
risk reduction would be held in abeyance. Effectively, then,
feasibility regulation would be gutted, not due to a problem with
feasibility analysis but because scientific advances have not been
geared to feasible risk reduction.
2. Social Welfare Analysis and the Welfarist Virtues of Feasibility
Analysis
The second objection pertains to social welfare. Professors Masur
and Posner advocate social welfare maximization. They argue that
feasibility analysis fails to be consistent with that end.
Social welfare maximization reflects a quantitative decision
procedure with an aim focused on maximization.278 Unlike some
other decision procedures, it permits consideration of risks to life,
liberty and property. As Masur and Posner explain, “Social welfare
maximization favors wider approaches, to the extent that decision
costs can be minimized, because people’s welfare depends on a range
of activities and conditions, not just (for example) the bare fact of
being alive.”279
Social welfare analysis borrows aspects of
utilitarianism and even CBA.
Instead of counting money,
satisfaction (happiness) may be considered, calculated and weighed.
It may be reduced to a single metric and weighed against cost. As we
will see, the happiness considered is limited to the views of only
some and not all.
Social welfare theory looks to reduce decision costs and factor
more than just life into the decisions. There is no special relative
weighting between life, liberty, and property. In this sense, social
welfare analysis turns out to favor property by placing it on a par
278. This approach is consistent with the view of Delaware courts, that profit
maximization is a corporation’s fiduciary duty. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A 3d 1, 34 (Del. Chancery 2010).
279. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 699-700 (2010).
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with life and liberty.280 The theory, then, offers nothing special to
protect life.
Happiness and consumer satisfaction, the measurement of welfare,
can come from various combinations of liberty and property. This
seems consistent with income maximization and wealth
maximization. If we use more, do we think we are happier?281 For
those who think so, social welfare analysis represents yet another
foot on the gas pedal.
Feasibility analysis, on the other hand, represents a foot on the
safety brake. Feasibility is not a welfare-oriented decision procedure.
That is why it is problematic in the context of social welfare analysis.
Feasibility analysis is risk analysis. It exists primarily as a means of
controlling risk and ensuring safety. It may be implemented in a way
that places life over liberty and property, a kind of sufficientarian
approach.282 This would support notions of morality, justice, and
human survival.
When Masur and Posner examine feasibility through a welfarist
lens, they spot the “three welfarist virtues of feasibility analysis” as
advanced by David Driesen, whom they regard as “the leading
defender of feasibility analysis.”283 Masur and Posner then attack
each of the three virtues for its shortcomings. The three virtues are:
that [feasibility analysis] ensures that agencies regulate industrial
processes that create harms that are difficult to monetize; that it ensures
280. Such a ranking is problematic. Consider the ranking of fundamental rights.
If life is not supported by both liberty and property, humanity places itself at risk.
281. There are many studies showing that happiness is not tied to things or
wealth. Recent studies have tied it to gratitude. Emily L. Polak & Michael E.
McCullough, Is gratitude an alternative to materialism?, 7 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 343
(2006); Jeffrey J. Froh et al., Gratitude and subjective well-being in early
adolescence: Examining gender differences, 32 J. ADOLESCENCE 633 (2009);
Steven Toepfer et al., Letters of gratitude: Further evidence for author benefits, 13
J. HAPPINESS STUD. 187 (2012).
282. See, e.g., Christopher Freiman, Why Poverty Matters Most: Towards a
Humanitarian Theory of Social Justice, 24 UTILITAS 26 (2012); Liam Shields, The
Prospects for Sufficientarianism, 24 UTILITAS 101 (2012).
283. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 700 (2010) (citing David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, CostBenefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 34-41
(2005)).
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that regulation does not impose concentrated harms on workers and
spreads the costs of regulation among consumers; and that it provides
clear guidance for agencies, thus avoiding arbitrary and inconsistent
regulatory outcomes.284

Let’s consider their view of Driesen’s virtues.
a. Does Feasibility Analysis Overcome Difficulties with
Monetization?
Feasibility analysis’s first virtue is that it helps where monetization
is difficult. It is based on an assumption “that known risks of harm
should be reduced as far as possible, consistent with technological
and economic feasibility.”285 As Masur and Posner note: “Although
one must identify harmful substances—so, again, lack of available
data could still hinder regulations—once one has done this, it is not
necessary to calculate precise risks and to monetize harms.”286
Although substances subject to regulation in the course of
manufacturing are the immediate subject matter, feasible risk
reduction can be applied widely to maximize liberty within the realm
of reduced risk.
Masur and Posner are correct to note that feasibility analysis
stipulates that “the economy should not be shut down.” They go on
to question, since feasibility analysis “does not explain how far
regulation should go: at what point should we regard suppression of
economic activity as too great to justify a regulation that reduces
risk?”287 This aspect of feasibility analysis (the concomitant
measurement of safety and feasibility without monetization) has not
yet been refined. What Masur and Posner see as a flaw is likely a
future refinement in Driesen’s virtue.
Economic feasibility is in need of further refinement. We do not
yet have an effective test that honors both the requirements of a safe
life and the liberty interests implicit in feasibility itself. Critics
express concerns about inelasticity of demand, the goods and services
284. Id. (citing David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 37-38, 41-48 (2005)).
285. Id. at 701.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 702.
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we say we cannot live without. Measuring and identifying critical
points in elasticity of demand may help us better gauge the maximum
amount of liberty humanity can safely have with those activities that
bear significant risk.
b. Are Thin Increases in Consumer Cost the Same as Worker
Hardships?
Driesen argues that feasibility analysis does not impose
excessively concentrated plant closings or other such hardships on
workers and communities.288 Instead, a thin increase in consumer
cost, spread widely, can be weighed against the cost of preventing
seriously diminished health (say, lung cancer prevented by air
pollution regulation) for a few.289
Masur and Posner object, saying, “the focus on avoiding
concentrated harms does not justify feasibility analysis in a broad
range of cases.”290 For instance, “feasibility analysis may force
regulators to trade the health (and lives) of a few individuals for the
jobs of a greater number of workers.”291 It may be that in some cases
a focus on concentrated harms would not be justified. On the other
hand, if we focus on those harms with catastrophic risk or risk of life
and death, those decisions may be easier to make.
The professors also object to the special treatment of risk: “in an
effort to emphasize larger concentrated costs over smaller dispersed
ones, feasibility analysis errs by valuing those small costs at zero.”292
However, the primary purpose of feasibility analysis is the reduction
of significant risks. As we weigh risks, we weigh fundamental rights.
We value life over liberty and property. Masur and Posner are
wrong: feasibility analysis does not value other fundamental rights at
zero. It merely prioritizes a commitment to life.
Although feasibility analysis can be morally strong, current
implementation is flawed. For example, the professors observe
significant problems of compromised design and implementation:
288. See id. (citing David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 37-40 (2005)).
289. See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657, 703 (2010).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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The approach of feasibility analysis thus creates significant
problems of over- and underregulation. Overregulation
occurs because feasibility analysis ignores the cost of
regulations to consumers—the costs they incur because
prices rise or products disappear from the market.
Underregulation occurs because feasibility analysis
tolerates dangerous industrial practices if regulation would
shut down plants.293
Under-regulation and over-regulation are arrived at by Masur and
Posner’s definition, based on their value judgments.
The professors are right to be concerned that costs not be ignored.
However, rather than drive the process, costs should be the result of a
process. When it comes to fundamental rights, costs—propertyoriented values—should not be the cause of regulation so much as
respect for life and liberty.
If feasibility analysis is properly applied, it is applied within a
series of steps, first with a determination of significance of risk,
secondly with selective application of the safety standard, followed
then by the application of technological feasibility.
If that
technological analysis is properly applied, some practices bearing
significant risk would be tolerated. The examples Masur and Posner
consider pertain to economic feasibility.
The professors then compare what they see as under-regulation and
over-regulation with CBA. Their statement about CBA is telling:
“CBA, by contrast, takes into account all the costs that regulations
impose on consumers, as well as the benefits.”294 However, CBA
misses externalities—and thus does not take into account all the costs
of the practices being regulated, only the direct and measurable costs
of the regulation. This is a crucial flaw. Even consumers, the
primary focus of CBA, pick up a layer of significant risk. And many
of the problems that Masur and Posner attribute to feasibility analysis
also apply to CBA.295
293. Id. at 704.
294. Id.
295. See David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest

Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2011). For
instance, Driesen shows that CBA proves path dependent and time inconsistent.
See id. at 334-36. Unfortunately, attacking CBA, without more, does nothing to
show how feasibility analysis is functionally any less risky than CBA.
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But the professors help identify the key problem with the
systematic use of feasible risk reduction, and that is whether a system
built on unlimited self-interest can be brought under control without
wrecking it and causing the crash we all seek to avoid. Can humanity
be flexible enough to make the changes necessary for its survival?
Can we find ways to feed the hungry? Can we find ways to employ,
reuse, and reinvent? And how can we all afford it when we are so
deeply in debt? These are not easy questions. These concerns need
to be addressed in a new academic conversation.
c. Is the Guidance from Feasibility Analysis Sufficiently Clear?
The third and final virtue of feasibility analysis advanced by
Driesen is that of clarity, that the feasible risk reduction procedure
provides meaningful guidance to regulators.296 Masur and Posner
respond by arguing vagueness, or more precisely, problems with
theoretical coherence:
The real problem is not the vagueness of words—words are
always vague—but the absence of a theoretically coherent
normative basis for feasibility analysis, a theory the analyst
can draw upon in order to flesh out these terms in specific
regulatory contexts. CBA also uses vague terms, and
requires some choices that are relatively arbitrary. But if
the analyst keeps the overall goal of CBA in mind—the
promotion of public wellbeing—then the ambiguities can
be resolved. Feasibility analysis’s notion of balancing
employment and health and safety provides no similar
guidance because it offers no theoretical way to determine
the correct balance.297
Masur and Posner are correct: The means to determine the correct
balance have not yet been perfected. As a result, they conclude, “Our
own survey of feasibility analyses by agencies provides little

296. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory
Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 41-48 (2005).
297. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 705-06 (2010).
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evidence that this test guides or constrains agencies.”298 Although
they seem not to recognize it, they show that feasibility analysis has
been misapplied. This is not, as they contend, the same as a lack of
theoretical foundation. Politics assist with the misapplication and
cause feasible risk reduction to appear toothless and meaningless.
But feasibility analysis does offer guidance—the reduction of risk
to the extent feasible, first technologically, and then economically.
Each is a separate test.
The guidance says nothing about job losses or plant closings.299 It
aims only at risk, but it does so with clarity and transparency, to
allow the kind of signaling that our array of risks require. This
technological feasibility involves a current or a “doable” standard. In
its common form, technological feasibility follows from
identification of significant risk and the decision that the activity
cannot cease without another risk, a commensurable and significant
risk. The guidance is clear.
It may be possible to reduce technologically feasible risk reduction
to a scientific calculation. The next step, risk reduction to the extent
economically feasible, involves a calculation that says, “We cannot
afford to do without this much of this activity.” We may not yet
know how to make that calculation accurately, and if we are not
careful, we could place either incommensurable risks on equal
footing or one commensurable risk in a dominant position over
another.
3. Finding a Normative Basis for Feasibility Analysis
Masur and Posner question whether feasibility analysis has a
normative basis. Is the kind of thinking behind feasible risk
reduction part of our normal behavior? Do humans attempt to
maximize liberty after doing their best to maximize safety? Some do,
but in the Land of Liberty, the approach of feasible risk reduction has
not been generally operationally endorsed. Perhaps our wide array of

298. Id. at 706.
299. Competitive politics have required the consideration of job losses and plant

closings. Unfortunately, David Driesen considers this part of the theory of feasible
risk reduction. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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decision-making reflects different values, valuations of activities, or
tolerances of risk.
But as we have already discussed,300 risk decisions need to be
informed decisions. The combinations of risk before humanity are
greater than we have perceived them to date. Maybe “Safety First”
should have a greater and wider appeal.
As Masur and Posner consider a wide range of behavior, they
return to welfarism, a decision-making system that considers overall
well-being: “Welfarism normally suggests that all aspects of a
person’s well-being be taken into account . . . .”301 Although the
considerations may sound all-encompassing, this approach is
splintered in that welfare seems to pertain to or attach to only a
limited class of people, not to everyone. Those who are in the
position to make the calculation are making it for themselves or their
group. The effects on the well-being of others outside the group are
not taken into account.
A limited welfarism that takes self-interest into account is likely to
generate negative externalities for others. Welfarism is also
splintered, scattered, or better, overextended, in another way.
Welfarism tries to do too much with its emphasis on taking all
aspects of well-being into account.
Although Masur and Posner support welfarism as the norm against
which feasibility analysis should be applied, they raise a very
interesting possibility:
Perhaps, though, feasibility analysis can be based on a
version of welfarism that stresses [employment, health, and
safety] over all others. This could be attached to
incommensurability worries—that certain values shouldn’t
be traded off each other, that it is wrong for an agency to
hold off regulating a substance that damages workers’
lungs so that consumer products will be a few dollars
cheaper.302

300. See Confronting Risk (I.) above.
301. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.

REV. 657, 707 (2010).
302. Id. at 707-08 (citing ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE
ECONOMICS 44-64 (1993)).
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The professors note that most economists reject this argument303 but
that such philosophers as Martha Nussbaum can identify a list of
basic qualities that constitute well-being. The list of values they
extract from Nussbaum’s work includes: “life; bodily health; bodily
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical
reason; affiliation (including the goods of both friendship and selfrespect); play; other species; and control over one’s environment
(including both political rights and property rights).”304 Here we
encounter a rift between philosophy and economics: Whether to
weigh all values as equal, or some as most fundamental and
incommensurable with the others. We will return to the rift
momentarily.
F. Implementing Welfarism with Feasibility Analysis
Can we connect the decision philosophy of welfarism to survival
theory? Welfarism attempts to measure such things as happiness,305
often through the employment of polling with a unitary metric.
Welfarism’s approach seems limited or incomplete, though, as
current conceptions seem to help only some people. As originally
conceptualized, welfarism applied to the individual.306 Generally to
date, it has not been extended to groups or organizations.307 We
303. Although no reason for rejection is provided, the economists’ rejection is
likely to be based on efficiency concerns. These are the very same concerns that
have caused us to chew up and poison our environment at an increasing rate.
Efficiency, without more, is the basis for a philosophy of growth.
304. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 708 (2010) (citing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-80 (2000)).
305. What matters more than the degree of happiness is the source of the
happiness. Recall that happiness research overlooks the notion that the source of
one’s happiness matters. See Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The
Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 535 (2011). At this
point in history, achieving happiness through equality or cooperation should be
preferable to doing so through consumption or overpopulation.
306. See L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND ETHICS 184-223 (1996);
Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp, Welfarism in Moral Theory, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J.
PHIL. 598 (1996).
307. But see the country of Bhutan’s tracking of gross national happiness
(GNH). However, GNH represents a cumulation of individual perspectives. See,
Thaddeus Metz, Gross National Happiness: A philosophical appraisal, 8. ETHICS
& SOC. WELFARE 218 (2014); Tokuda Yasuharu et al., Individual and Country-
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should not pay attention to the well-being of only certain individuals.
Instead of helping just some, it would be best to help all of us survive
and achieve a decent life.
Welfarism also fails to consider individuals holistically. It only
considers the subjective well-being of those individuals polled as
consumers.
Welfarism is a distributional decision-making system that argues
for maximum happiness. Where does this social welfare theory fit
with survival theory? Distribution analysis does not need to—and
should not—displace risk analysis.
We need to implement measures of risk reduction and safety
before filtering for anything else. Human decision-making processes
are likely to be clogged and inefficient if they are required to process
and distribute risks that humanity shouldn’t be taking in the first
place. And the distractions these efforts create can, at the very least,
obscure our vision of risk.
As a result, there are two conditions for the application of welfarist
decision analysis to survival theory:
1. Welfarism must be complete. Welfare analysis, distribution
analysis, must cover everyone,308 since we are all on this Earth
together.309 We are one.310
2. Risk analysis must occur first in sequence. There is nothing
wrong with Safety First. Once a decision is on solid and safe ground,
we can consider welfare and fairness and forward-looking
Level Effects of Social Trust on Happiness: The Asia Barometer Survey, 40 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2574 (2010).
308. To fail to recognize the fairness needs of everyone may is likely to increase
the risk to the group as well as the risk to certain individuals within it.
309. This is a tall order for welfarism. Welfarism is grounded in the sanctity of
the rights of the individual. The question may be whether we can view the greater
group of humanity as an individual, as one.
310. Thanks, Bono Vox.
Being one is not a simple task. As Richard Falk observes, “[N]onparticipation and
oppression go together even if ‘the oppressor’ adheres to a benign creed.”
RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR
HUMAN SURVIVAL 310 (1971). This means that being one cannot be forced. Any
resulting insurrection might carry significant risk. Although a wise man once said
it’s easier to catch bees with honey than with vinegar, that view should not serve to
trivialize the effort and care required to succeed. By providing insight into animal
motivations, the idea of attraction merely gives direction for the effort of
cooperation.
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distribution. In the interest of life, first, and liberty, second, decisions
need to be safe, first, and fair, second.
Even once we have taken risk into account, we are not entirely
finished with risk. Welfarism itself contains a risk of failure.
Welfarist applications, especially those that focus on a limited group,
contain an unnecessary risk, the failure of fairness.
Unfair
311
Among other problems, such
distribution represents a risk.
behavior invites rebellion by the have-nots.312 For this reason,
welfarism should be applied relatively early in the decision-making
process. Once life is assured, fairness and justice in the interest of
liberty must be considered.
Exactly how we should implement the decisional filter of
welfarism is a complex question deserving further investigation.
Philosophers, economists, lawyers, scientists, and environmentalists,
all of us need to carefully consider implementational issues of equity,
fairness, and justice. Where fairness considerations collide with the
needs of humanity’s life support system, are we not all
environmentalists?
By sequentially following risk analysis,
welfarism represents a stabilizer, possibly a critical stabilizer, with
regard to certain liberty of action.313
1. Welfarist Problems with Incommensurability
Returning to the rift between philosophy and economics. The
question is whether all of welfarism’s qualities of wellbeing (e.g., the
“open-ended and humble”314 list of ten central human functional
capabilities identified by law and philosophy professor Martha
Nussbaum) are commensurable remains.
Masur and Posner side with the economists, in favor of
commensurability between many of the Nussbaum’s rights, as they
311. These distributional risks can be separated from other significant risks as, in
a time of scarcity, risks of fairness pertain to the liberty interests of the taker at the
possible expense of life itself.
312. Generally, welfarism should not invite rebellion by the “haves,” as the
forward looking distribution of welfarism in the context of survival does not
include redistribution from the haves to the have-nots. However, there should be a
concern about those haves who make a living by exploiting the commons.
313. It may be that one of the most effective ways to implement social welfare
theory is through taxation.
314. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 77 (2000).
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compare their conception of welfare to the welfare afforded by
feasibility analysis: “Feasibility analysis advances bodily health and
bodily integrity but it does not take into account the other goods, with
the result that regulations will favor only two of the eight items on
Nussbaum’s list and, similarly, a small portion of the goods on other
philosophers’ lists.”315 There were actually ten items on the list,316
but their point seems to be that many goods, possibly including life
itself, would be ignored.
Doesn’t feasibility analysis advance life as well as bodily health
and bodily integrity? Masur and Posner seem to place at least some
of the functional capabilities in Nussbaum’s analysis317 on a par with
life (including the bodily health and bodily integrity that are
necessary for life). They are not precise about what they favor. If
they do place even a few of the remaining characteristics or rights on
a par with life, their analysis is likely to fail to recognize the
incommensurability of life itself.
Generally, those remaining items tend to be, by function, parts of
human nature or parts of liberty. There is dominion in the property
rights. And finally, as an interesting exception, the rights include
other species, parts of humanity’s life support system.318 Masur and
Posner seem to prefer having more of these values or capabilities on
the same plane with life, bodily health, and bodily integrity (bodily
health and bodily integrity being taken to include life itself).319
315. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 708 (2010).
316. For whatever reason, Professors Masur and Posner failed to explicitly
consider the human capability of “life” in their analysis.
317. Again, the remaining seven qualities, numbers four through ten from
Nussbaum’s list, are: 4.senses, imagination, and thought; 5. emotions; 6. practical
reason; 7. affiliation (including the goods of both friendship and self-respect); 8.
other species; 9. play; and 10. control over one’s environment (including both
political rights and property rights).
318. Due to risk of environmental avalanche, the rights and health of other
species is a risk on a par with life and health.
319. Would Martha Nussbaum consider the ten functional capabilities
comparable?
She does not consider them interchangeable: “The list is
emphatically, a list of separate components. We cannot satisfy the need for one of
them by giving a larger amount of another one. All are of central importance and
all are distinct in quality.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 81 (2000). The components are not
fungible. Some are not commensurable with others. There is a comparability
problem, and Professor Nussbaum avoids it.
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Although some of the values may belong on that plane,320 others
don’t. The prime value of life in the ranking of fundamental rights
reveals the flaw in an approach the treats all ten functional
capabilities as being of similar quality and significance. Liberty and
property rights are means to support life, not ends like the infinite
value of life itself.
However, feasible risk reduction, the approach Masur and Posner
attack, turns out to be appropriate when life is ranked over liberty and
property. The three are incommensurable. Life and health deserve
special treatment, especially the lives and health of those who have
not consented to risk exposure.
G. Summarizing Feasibility Analysis in Risk Regulation
How we approach risk regulation makes a huge difference. If our
object is to regulate a significant risk and protect against it, we need
safety and feasibility analysis. If our object is maximize societal
wealth or social welfare, we need CBA or social welfare analysis.321
The rule depends upon the goal.
Masur and Posner are concerned about consumers, the efficiencies
of CBA, and regulatory precision, rather than accuracy and safety.
By making an efficiency-based claim, they find that governmental
use of feasibility analysis leads to both under- and over-regulation.
By what standard? By comparison to CBA, of course. Their concern
is that excessive risk reduction harms consumers.322 Generally, there
is not an identity of regulation between the two theories. They are
based on entirely different principles, and their purposes differ.
However, Masur and Posner conclude that “feasibility analysis lacks
a normative justification and should have no place in government
regulation.”323
In response, one could conclude that CBA lacks a safety-based
justification and that it, instead, should have no place in government
320. Arguably the senses (part of bodily integrity) and other species (our life
support system) are on the same plane as life.
321. Social welfare analysis includes, for example, the welfarist distribution
analysis discussed in Implementing Welfarism with Feasibility Analysis (VI.F) just
above. Definitions of social welfare can abound, but generally, the notion includes
maximization.
322. To date, we have tended to worry first about GDP.
323. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 662 (2010).
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regulation. Is the purpose of government regulation to protect us or
is it to make sure that a few of us achieve great wealth—even when it
comes at the incommensurable expense of significant health and
safety risks for everyone? Without feasible risk reduction, even
those who are among the lucky few will find themselves at risk from
their own activities. No one will be safe. However, if it is well
engineered, better than it has been, feasibility regulation can protect
us all and simultaneously provide us, Americans, and even humanity,
with the maximum amount of safe liberty.
CONCLUSION
No matter how many theories of risk there may be, humanity has
an interest in quickly researching the spectrum of risk reduction in
between traditional CBA and the precautionary principle, to find
useful stops and approaches and to figure out how they may best be
used for the survival of the human species.
I argue that humanity should employ the safety and feasibility
standards as a combined decision tool. Safety and feasibility stack on
top of each other. Either would be employed for the same degree of
risk: only for practically foreseeable risks that are significant (and for
at least some of those risks subject to accumulation, combination, or
erosion into significance).
We need to think about and attempt to plan the transition. If we do
it poorly, it will be like slapping on the brakes on a narrow road. If
we do it well, we will be dealing with the next systemic problem.
We must begin by determining significant risk, followed by
selective use of the safety standard, and next by assessing elasticity
of demand for risk-producing behavior in order to protect essential
liberty. There are some behaviors (e.g., the manufacture of some
things) that we cannot live without. If we can live without the
behavior, it should be subject to the safety test either as a life-saving
application as with clean air and clean water, or by reducing risk to
insignificance with feasibility analysis. Then, if we cannot live
without the behavior, we must reduce significant risk to the extent
feasible.
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Certainly other tests can and should be brought into play.324 For
example, there should be some kind of decision tool or filter for
equity and fairness. We may also want some limits on behavior that
interferes with important fundamentals such as education. Humanity
should probably want systems of nudges and clear signaling to help
encourage necessary cooperation. Otherwise, we become too much
the police state, and incur new risks. We need liberty.
Our systems must express love and respect for the life of the
human family. Let’s work together to do what we can to save lives
without giving up our most precious liberties. For the risks that we
are unwilling to eradicate,325 let’s reduce significant risk and preserve
lives in being to the extent feasible.
By employing these decision tools together in the law, humanity
better controls risk and begins to systematize approaches toward a
longer-term survival of the human species. By protecting life to the
extent possible, we can better see and more easily understand how to
value life over liberty and property. We put actions in place of
words, and we embrace in law a shared future of justice and life.

324. There are many risk reduction tests, filters, approaches and requirements
that should be considered for use in a new decisional system. These include
systems of nudges and defaults (See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008);
Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2013)), concerndriven risk management (See Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox, Jr., Does ConcernDriven Risk Management Provide a Viable Alternative to QRA?, 27 RISK
ANALYSIS 27 (2007)), the Laswellian approach to policy analysis (See Sidney A.
Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008)), and informational regulation
(See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1582 (2002)).
325. An unwillingness to eradicate a behavior would be for a good or service
with highly inelastic demand in the face of significant risk.

